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Abstract
We investigate the impact of monetary policy shocks (the surprise change in the Fed Funds
rate (FFR)) on excess corporate bonds returns. We obtain a significant negative response of
bond returns to FFR shocks. This effect is especially strong in the period before the 2007-
09 financial crisis and for bonds with longer maturity and lower rating. We show that the
largest portion of this response is related to higher expected excess bond returns, especially
term premia news. Therefore, the discount-rate channel represents an important mechanism
through which monetary policy affects corporate bonds. However, the financial crisis has
attenuated this effect.
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1 Introduction
While the impact of monetary policy actions on the stock and Treasury bond markets has been
widely studied, previous research in the area of corporate bonds is considerably less dense.1
Given the relevance of debt financing for firms and the size of the market for corporate debt,
it is important to understand how monetary policy affects the pricing of corporate bonds.2
Especially more so, since the Federal Reserve (Fed) is in the process of normalising monetary
conditions, following a prolonged period of ultra-loose monetary policy.
In this paper, we conduct an empirical analysis of the effects of unanticipated monetary
policy actions on the contemporaneous returns of corporate bonds. The main contribution of
the paper lies on identifying the channels through which monetary policy shocks affect corporate
bond returns. In order to get an insight into the observed reaction, we utilise a return decom-
position framework that relates current realized unexpected excess bond returns to revisions in
expectations (“news”) about the future excess bond return (discount rate news or bond premium
news) and the short-term interest rate (interest rate news). The decomposition of returns to
news about macro-fundamentals and expected risk premia was pioneered in bond market stud-
ies by Campbell and Ammer (1993) using Treasury bond returns. The methodology is flexible
enough to allow for the incorporation of monetary policy shifts in the analysis. This enables us
to decompose the response of corporate bond returns to shocks in the Federal funds rate (FFR)
into the effects on each of the two news components. Specifically, according to this present-value
model, an increase in FFR has a negative effect on current corporate bond returns, because it
leads to an increase in future bond risk premia, short-term interest rates, or a combination of
these two effects.
Although monetary policy proxies have been included in studies of corporate bond return
predictability and empirical investigation of the determinants of the corporate-government bond
yield spread, we are the first to examine the contemporaneous response of corporate bond returns
1Stock market studies typically find that the contemporaneous response of returns to a monetary tightening
shock is negative (Thorbecke, 1997; Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; Kontonikas and Kostakis, 2013; Maio, 2014).
Analyses of Treasuries show that bond yields respond significantly to shifts in the policy rate (Kuttner, 2001;
Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2002; Gurkaynak et al., 2005; Hanson and Stein, 2015). The literature on corporate bonds
is overall less voluminous, and even thinner with regards to the impact of monetary policy actions. Previous
studies tend to focus on two issues—the predictability of corporate bond returns (Fama and French, 1989; Jensen
et al., 1996; Baker et al., 2003; Greenwood and Hanson, 2013) and the factors that determine the credit spread
(Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001; Elton et al., 2001; Driessen, 2005; Avramov et al., 2007; Gertler and Karadi, 2015;
Javadi et al., 2017; Nozawa, 2017). With the exception of a small number of studies that we discuss later
in this section, the role of monetary policy actions in general, and policy rate shocks in particular, has been
under-explored in the case of corporate bonds.
2The U.S. market for corporate debt is the largest in the world. The value of outstanding U.S. corporate debt
at the end of 2014 was about 7.8 trillion dollars according to data from the Securities Industry and Financial
Markets Association.
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to monetary policy shocks and its decomposition into the components of excess bond returns.
Our analysis focuses on monetary policy shocks, which are identified by using data on FFR
futures contracts (Kuttner, 2001), since anticipated policy actions should be already priced in
the bond market.3 We use monthly return data on both long-term and intermediate corporate
bond indices, each of them associated with three different credit ratings (AAA, AA, and A).
By conducting simple regressions over the 1989.02–2013.12 and 1989.02–2007.07 periods, we
obtain a negative and significant response of excess returns on corporate bonds to shocks in
FFR prior to the financial crisis. This conclusion remains valid across both medium and longer
maturities as well as across different credit ratings. The effect of monetary policy on bond
returns is weaker and less significant in the full sample, indicating potential implications of the
financial crisis and the subsequent change in Fed policy stance. Similar results are obtained when
we examine monetary policy effects on unexpected excess bond returns, which are obtained from
a first-order VAR.
With respect to the bond return variance decomposition, for the pre-crisis period we provide
evidence that discount rate news constitute the key driving force that explains the response of
bond returns to monetary shocks. In other words, the largest share of the contemporaneous
negative response of corporate bond returns to monetary policy tightening can be attributed
to higher expected excess bond returns (higher bond risk premia). The effects of monetary
policy shocks on the expectations of short-term interest rates are relatively small when it comes
to explaining the negative effect of interest rate rises on current bond returns. Therefore, the
discount rate channel represents an important mechanism through which monetary policy affect
corporate bonds. These results are robust across the six bond indices analyzed, however there
are some relevant differences across these bond categories. First, the impact of policy changes
on bond premia news is larger on longer-maturity compared to intermediate-maturity bonds.
Second, the share of bond premia news in the total (absolute) return response tends to be
stronger for bonds with higher credit rating.
The results for the full sample that includes the recent financial turmoil (2007–2009) are
somewhat different. For this period, across most of the bond indices considered, what explains
the negative bond return responses to monetary tightening shocks are positive revisions in future
short-term interest rates. The bond premia channel is significantly less relevant when it comes to
3For example, in anticipation of the increase in the FFR in December 2015, the Economist (December 12,
2015) points out: “If the Federal Reserve does increase interest rates on December 16th, very few investors will
be taken by surprise. It will be the most discussed, most anticipated rate rise in history”. The use of FFR shocks
as a proxy for U.S. monetary policy shifts is well-established in the related literature (Bernanke and Mihov, 1998;
Romer and Romer, 2004; Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005).
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explaining the impact of the Fed policy on bond returns. These results should be a consequence
of two facts originating in the recent financial crisis. First, the significant rise in volatility in
corporate bond prices and the widening of credit spreads. Second, the change in Fed policy
by adopting a ultra-expansionary stance that led the Fed funds target to attain the zero-lower
bound (mixed with the adoption of unconventional policies, which represent new interventions
in credit and bond markets). Both of these events likely lead to significant outliers in (i) the
relationship between FFR shocks and corporate bond returns and (ii) the estimation of the bond
return decomposition. This could explain why the impact of policy shocks on bond premia news
is significantly attenuated when we include the most recent period in the sample.
We conduct an extensive sensitivity analysis to our benchmark results. First, we use alterna-
tive state vector specifications for the underlying VAR model. Second, we consider higher-order
VARs. Third, we use the consol bond formulas to conduct the variance decomposition for re-
turns on long-term corporate bonds. Fourth, we consider an alternative identification scheme
for the components of excess bond returns. Fifth, we use lagged FFR shocks as an exogenous
variable in the VAR and also employ the methodology suggested by Romer and Romer (2004)
to calculate monetary policy shocks. Finally, we account for risk premia in the FFR futures
contracts. Overall, our main findings are robust to these robustness checks.
In the last part of the paper, we compute an alternative bond return decomposition, which
disentangles bond premia news into one component related to term premia news and another
component related with credit premia news. Our findings clearly suggest that the reaction of the
corporate bond market to monetary policy shifts is primarily related to risk premium revisions,
which in turn are related with the slope of the yield curve (term premia news) rather than related
to credit risk (credit premia news). Hence, term premia plays a significantly more important role
in driving expected corporate bond returns, at least in what concerns the reaction to monetary
policy surprises.
Methodologically, this paper is closely linked to the stock market study of Bernanke and
Kuttner (2005), who use a similar monetary policy proxy and decompose the total stock return
reaction to monetary policy shocks into the components of realized stock returns. Critically, our
paper extends their analysis to corporate bonds and provides additional evidence supporting
their insight about an increase in risk premia in response to tight money shocks. Thus, the
relation between monetary shocks and future risk premia is not confined to the stock market
and also holds in the corporate bond market.4 This work is also related to a recent study
4The study of Jensen et al. (1996) is one of the few papers that examine the relationship between monetary
policy and expected corporate bond returns using a predictability framework. They characterise monetary policy
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by Gertler and Karadi (2015) who use FFR futures contracts to calculate monetary policy
shocks and find that the increase in private credit costs, in response to unexpected tightening,
primarily reflects higher risk premia. The focus on this paper, however, is different since we
model the impact of monetary policy shocks on corporate bond index portfolio returns and also
use a different method to decompose the total return response to interest rate shocks into the
unobserved components of excess bond returns.5 In related work, Nozawa (2017) decomposes
yield spreads for corporate bonds into changing expected returns and changing expectation of
credit losses and finds that they are both significant in explaining the variance of credit spreads.
Our work differs in three main ways: first, we conduct a decomposition for excess corporate bond
returns; second, we focus on high quality (nearly default free) corporate bonds and therefore do
not consider a term that reflects credit losses; third, and perhaps more importantly, our paper’s
emphasis lays on the monetary policy effects on bond risk premia. This work is also related
with a broad literature that studies the interaction between macro variables and corporate bond
returns (Elton et al., 1995; Bessembinder et al., 2009; Giesecke et al., 2011; Bali and Wen, 2017).
This paper provides additional evidence supporting the significant role that news about
expected returns or discount rates play in explaining asset price fluctuations. The primacy of
risk premia news is typical in previous return decomposition studies that examine stocks at
the market level (Campbell, 1991; Campbell and Ammer, 1993; Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005),
but not in studies that analyse Treasury bonds.6 The latter tend to identify other components
(inflation news) as the key driver of excess bond returns (Campbell and Ammer, 1993; Engsted
and Tanggaard, 2007; Kontonikas et al., 2015). Hence, the type of borrower (sovereign versus
corporations) seems to play an important role on the reaction of investors to fundamental news.
In this particular dimension (i.e., the relative correlation of contemporaneous unexpected excess
returns to discount rate news), corporate bonds seem to behave more like stocks, rather than
Treasuries.7 Thus, our results also contribute towards a better understanding of the similarities
using a dummy variable, based on previous changes in the Fed’s discount rate, which captures monetary regimes
(expansive vs. restrictive cycles) rather than policy shocks. After controlling for the effect of the business
conditions variables of Fama and French (1989), they find no evidence for a direct monetary effect on expected
returns and only weak evidence for an indirect effect.
5The “excess bond premium” that Gertler and Karadi (2015) consider is based upon previous work by Gilchrist
and Zakrajsek (2012). Firm-level data is used to calculate the credit spread and then decompose it in two compo-
nents: a component that captures systematic movements in firm-specific default risk, and a residual component,
the excess bond premium, that reflects exposure to corporate credit risk in excess of the compensation for expected
defaults.
6Moreover, if we move from the market level to individual stocks (or portfolios of stocks) level, cash-flows news
become the main component of unexpected excess stock returns (Vuolteenaho, 2002; Maio, 2014).
7We also compute the policy responses of the stock market return and its components (discount-rate news,
cash-flow news, and interest rate news) for both the full and restricted samples. Our results are qualitatively
similar to those obtained for corporate bond returns. Specifically, discount-rate (equity premia) news is the major
channel of monetary policy transmission, although the magnitude of this effect has declined after the financial
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and differences that corporate bonds exhibit in comparison to other major asset classes. Apart
from informing financial managers about the exposure of corporate bonds to monetary policy
and interest rate risk, this line of research also has important implications for monetary policy
makers. Financial markets are relevant in several channels of the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy (Boivin et al., 2010) and the market for corporate debt, in particular, plays a
crucial role in the credit channel (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995).
We now briefly discuss how the risk premium effects of monetary policy actions may be
interpreted and rationalised. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) argue that tight money can have
a positive effect on expected returns by increasing the riskiness of firms. Specifically, firm
riskiness can increase, in response to an unexpected increase in the FFR, through a rise in the
interest burden and the weakening of balance sheets, which can also translate into an increase
in the credit spread.8 This risk-based explanation is consistent with asset pricing models in
which the (innovation) in a short-term interest rate (and specifically, the innovation in FFR)
is a priced risk factor that helps to explain cross-sectional equity risk premia (Brennan et al.,
2004; Petkova, 2006; Lioui and Maio, 2014; Maio and Santa-Clara, 2017). In these multifactor
models, the interest rate factor earns a negative price of risk, and thus stocks that have negative
interest rate factor loading (that is, negative return responses against positive changes in interest
rates) earn a higher risk premium, which translates into higher expected stock returns, relative
to stocks that are uncorrelated with short-term interest rates. Moreover, stocks with more
negative interest rate betas enjoy higher expected returns than stocks with less negative interest
rate loadings. In the same vein, corporate bonds with negative interest rate betas earn higher
expected returns than bonds with zero loadings on the interest rate factor. Likewise, bonds with
more negative interest betas earn higher expected returns than bonds with less negative loadings,
which is consistent with our empirical evidence for the pre-crisis sample (larger magnitudes in the
total return responses to FFR shocks tend to translate into more positive impacts on expected
bond returns).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describe the data and variables employed in the
empirical analysis. In Section 3, we measure the contemporaneous effect of monetary policy
crisis.
8According to the credit channel theory of monetary policy transmission, the effects of monetary policy shifts
on private borrowing costs are amplified through endogenous changes in the external finance premium. The
external premium reflects the cost differential between funds raised externally (by issuing equity or debt) and
funds generated internally, and is inversely related to the creditworthiness of the borrower. In line with this
theory’s prediction, apart from Gertler and Karadi (2015), a number of other studies demonstrate empirically
that the bond credit spread increases when monetary policy tightens (Avramov et al., 2007; Chun et al., 2014;
Cenesizoglu and Essid, 2012). In a recent study, Javadi et al. (2017) find that credit spreads mostly respond to
expansionary policy actions (by narrowing), while tightening only affects spreads when default and inflation risks
are ex ante high.
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shocks in corporate bond returns. Section 4 shows the results for a VAR-based decomposition
of the total bond return response to shocks in FFR into the effects on the two components of
excess bond returns. Section 5 provides a sensitivity analysis, while Section 6 shows the results
from an alternative decomposition. Section 7 concludes.
2 Data and variables
2.1 Corporate bond returns and state variables
U.S. corporate bond indices constructed by Barclays are used to calculate corporate bond re-
turns. The Barclays indices, formerly maintained by Lehman Brothers, are often used in aca-
demic studies to represent the U.S. corporate bond market and represent standard benchmarks
for managing bond portfolios in the asset management industry (Sangvinatsos, 2005; Abhyankar
and Gonzalez, 2009). They capture the total holding period return, by reflecting capital gains
and coupon payments, and incorporate USD-denominated, fixed-rate, taxable bonds that are
publicly issued by both U.S. and non-U.S. industrial, utility, and financial firms (minimum issue
size is USD 250 million). The indices are value-weighted and rebalanced at the end of each
month. All component bonds are marked by Barclays market-makers at the middle and end of
each month.9 Bonds with fixed-to-floating coupon rate are only included during their fixed-rate
term, while inflation-linked bonds, bonds with equity type features (e.g., warrants and convert-
ibles), and bonds with less than one year to maturity are excluded. Finally, in addition to bullet
bonds, the indices include bonds with embedded put and call options and sinking fund provi-
sions. The inclusion of bonds with embedded options in the Barclays indices is a non-trivial
matter when it comes to analysing the impact of monetary policy actions on corporate bond
returns. Due to changes in the value of the option, the price of such bonds is less sensitive to in-
terest rate changes, as opposed to comparable option-free bonds. The incorporation of callable
and putable bonds in the analysis should generally attenuate the reaction of corporate bond
returns to the interest rate shocks that the Fed initiates. Hence, it is likely that the monetary
policy elasticities that we capture in the next section would have been stronger in the absence
of bonds with embedded options.10
9The use of model/matrix-based pricing is limited to a minority of the bonds that enter the Barclays indices.
Specifically, up to 3,000 actively traded benchmark corporate bonds are priced by Barclays Capital traders on a
daily basis, while the remaining less liquid bonds are priced using an Option Adjusted Spread model or issuer
curve that is generated using these actively quoted benchmark bonds. For more details on the construction of
the Barclays indices see Goltz and Campani (2011) and the information that accompanied the rebranding of the
Lehman indices in November 2008, available at https://index.barcap.com/download?rebrandingDoc.
10Callable bonds constitute the majority of bonds with embedded options. Their share in the market for
corporate bonds has fluctuated significantly over time. It was very high until the late 1980s, decreasing to a
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The six Barclays indices that we use represent portfolios of investment-grade corporate bonds
with different maturity and credit rating characteristics. Specifically, we consider indices of long-
term (L) and intermediate (I) maturity corporate bonds with AAA, AA, and A ratings. Bond
ratings are assigned using the middle rating of Moodys, SP and Fitch, or the lowest rating if only
two ratings are available. Bonds included in the intermediate maturity indices have maturity
of one to less than ten years, while long-term indices are based on bonds with maturity of ten
years and more. Monthly data on the Barclays indices (end of month observations) is collected
over the period 1989.01–2013.12 from Datastream. The bond data sample commences during
the early years of the Great Moderation period, while its latter part contains the recent global
financial crisis and its aftermath.11 The empirical analysis is conducted over both the full sample
period and a shorter sample that ends in July 2007, that is, prior to the onset of the recent
financial crisis. This will allow us to isolate the potential effects of the crisis and the resulting
ultra-loose monetary stance on the variance decomposition of bond returns and the relationship
between monetary actions and bond returns.12
To compute monthly excess corporate bond returns (xn), we take the first difference in the log
of the Barclays index and subtract the continuously compounded one-month Treasury bill rate
(y) that we obtain from the Centre for Research in Security Prices.13 The descriptive statistics
in Table 1 indicate that both the mean and standard deviation of excess returns on long-term
corporate bonds are higher than those of intermediate maturity bonds. As the rating declines,
average returns tend to increase (especially among long-term bonds); removing the crisis period,
however, eliminates this effect. These patterns are also consistent with the graphical evidence
in Figure 1, which plots the (normalised) level of the Barclays indices for A and AAA long-term
and intermediate maturity bonds: prior to the crisis lower quality bonds did not outperform
higher quality bonds.14 For all indices under investigation, the standard deviation of excess
returns is lower in the pre-crisis period, as opposed to the full sample, highlighting the volatile
historical low by the mid-1990s, and then increasing again over the past decade. As Gilchrist and Zakrajsek
(2012) argue, limiting the sample to non-callable corporate bonds would significantly limit the available time-
span. Nozawa (2017) makes the same argument to support the inclusion of callable bonds in the sample and finds
that his main results are not driven by the callability feature.
11By the mid-1980s, Volcker’s disinflation was largely accomplished with inflation declining sharply from 10%
(per annum) at 1980 to 3% at 1983. This development allowed interest rates to decline and ushered the Great
Moderation era that was characterised by lower macroeconomic volatility.
12The start of the financial crisis is dated to August 2007 when doubts about financial stability emerged
and the first major central bank interventions in response to increasing interbank market pressures took place
(Brunnermeier, 2009; Kontonikas et al., 2013). Following that, on September 2007 the Fed proceeded to the first
major FFR cut (0.5%) since 2003, initiating a long cycle of monetary expansion.
13n denotes the average maturity of the bond index.
14Moreover, while in the full sample for intermediate maturity bonds lower rating is associated with higher
volatility of bond returns, for long-term bonds the opposite is true. However, this does not hold in the restricted
sample.
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nature of returns during the recent bad times. The full sample maximum and minimum values
of excess bond returns, shown in Table 1–Panel A, in almost all cases materialise at the peak of
the financial crisis, between September and December of 2008.
Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients between excess corporate bond returns across
different maturities and ratings. Three stylised facts can be identified. First, correlations are
stronger between bond returns of similar maturity. For example, while the full sample cor-
relation between long-term AAA and AA excess bond returns is 0.92, it declines to 0.79 for
when the latter are replaced with intermediate maturity AA returns. Second, the magnitude of
the correlation coefficients increases when the bonds that we consider are more alike in terms of
credit quality. For instance, the full sample correlation coefficient between intermediate maturity
AAA and AA excess bond returns is 0.94, dropping to 0.90 when we use, instead of the latter,
intermediate maturity A returns. Third, correlations are overall stronger during the pre-crisis
period.
In addition to corporate bond excess returns, the Treasury bill rate, and a proxy for monetary
policy shocks, the empirical analysis conducted in the following sections requires data on several
other variables. The default spread (def) is equal to the Moodys seasoned Baa corporate bond
yield minus the ten-year Treasury bond yield. The term spread (term) represents the difference
between the ten-year Treasury bond yield and the one-month Treasury bill rate.15 The Treasury
bond yield and Moody’s BAA yield data are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis
database (FREDII).
2.2 Monetary policy shocks
Monetary policy conducted during the period that we investigate is characterised by targeting
of the Fed Funds rate (FFR), the interest rate on overnight loans of reserves between banks, and
also by increasing transparency (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Bernanke and Mihov, 1998; Romer
and Romer, 2004). We proxy monetary policy shocks by isolating the unexpected component of
changes in the FFR. To do so, we use data on FFR futures and the methodology employed by
Kuttner (2001). This market-based proxy of policy shocks has been widely used in the literature
that examines the impact of monetary policy on stocks and bonds (Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005;
Bredin et al., 2010; Cenesizoglu and Essid, 2012; Kontonikas et al., 2015). The month t + 1
monetary policy shock (MP ) is calculated as follows:
15All the variables that we use are stationary according to the results from Augmented Dickey-Fuller and
Phillips Perron unit root tests (results available upon request).
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MPt+1 =
1
D
D∑
d=1
it+1,d − f1t,D, (1)
where it+1,d denotes the target FFR on day d of month t+1 and f
1
t,D is the rate corresponding
to the one-month futures contract on the last (Dth) day of month t. The implied futures rate is
100 minus the contract price.16 The futures data, sourced from Bloomberg, commences on 1989
with the first observation on MP corresponding to 1989.02. The FFR data are obtained from
the FREDII database.
Figure 2 plots our measure of monetary policy shocks. Some of the largest unexpected
changes in the FFR occurred during, or near, periods of economic slowdown. These pronounced
shocks were typically of monetary expansionary nature, that is, associated with negative values of
the MP indicator. Nevertheless, the recent major recession and financial crisis period witnessed
a large positive realisation of MP in November 2008. This reflects the fact that Fed kept
the target rate constant at 1% throughout November 2008, while market participants expected
further decline, following two rate decreases in October 2008. The final cut, which brought the
FFR down to the zero lower bound, took place in December 2008. Ever since, and until the end
of the sample, there were no rate changes and the volatility of FFR shocks dies out. This is not
surprising considering the effort that the Fed had put in assuring the public and financial markets
about its intention to keep the policy rate at near zero in the future.17 The Fed’s aggressive
interest rate response to the financial crisis was supplemented with liquidity provision facilities
and large scale purchases of mainly Treasury bonds and agency mortgage backed securities.
The bond market effects of the Fed’s unconventional policies are analysed in previous studies
(Gagnon et al., 2011; Christensen and Rudebusch, 2012; Wright, 2012; Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011) and are beyond the scope of this paper that focuses on conventional
FFR-based policy shocks.
The monetary policy indicator is included as an exogenous variable in the VAR model of
Section 4 below. The exogeneity assumption would not be valid if the Fed responds contempo-
16The 30-day Federal Funds Futures contracts that we use are traded on the Chicago Board of Trade. The
futures settlement price is based upon the monthly average effective FFR which follows very closely the target
rate (Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; Fama, 2013). It should be noted that measuring surprise changes in terms
of the average FFR may understate the magnitude of policy surprises. The time-aggregation issue is analysed in
Evans and Kuttner (1998). Cenesizoglu and Essid (2012) find that adjusting for the the risk premium in Federal
Funds contracts, by using the procedure of Piazzesi and Swanson (2008), makes no difference when analysing the
impact of FFR shocks on corporate bond yield spreads.
17Initially, the language was qualitative with post-meeting statements of the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) including phrases such as the FFR will remain near zero for “an extended period” (FOMC statement
of March 18, 2009). It then evolved to date-based guidance, specifying future dates such as “at least through
mid-2015” (September 13, 2012). Finally, a threshold-based approach was adopted linking the first rate increase
to developments in inflation and unemployment.
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raneously to developments in the market for corporate bonds (reverse feedback) and/or if the
Fed and corporate bonds jointly and contemporaneously respond to economic news (simultane-
ity). With respect to reverse feedback, while modifications of the Taylor rule have been recently
proposed, whereby the Fed responds to measures of financial stress including credit spreads
(Taylor, 2008; Curdia and Woodford, 2010), these rules refer to a systematic response involving
actual and expected FFR changes, as opposed to unexpected changes (Cenesizoglu and Essid,
2012). The use of shocks is crucial not only to ameliorate endogeneity concerns, but also because
anticipated policy actions should be already priced in the bond market.
In order to examine whether FFR shocks react to economic news we follow Bernanke and
Kuttner (2005) and regress these shocks on variables that capture surprises in nonfarm payrolls,
industrial production growth, retail sales growth, core and headline CPI inflation,
MPt+1 = α+ β
′ψt+1 + εt+1, (2)
where ψ denotes the vector of economic indicators. Surprises are calculated as the difference
between the actual value that was released for a given key macroeconomic variable and the
median forecast from Reuters Economic Polls. Table 3 reports the results.18 We do not find
a significant contemporaneous monetary policy response to macroeconomic surprises: only in
one case (industrial production in the estimation for the full sample) is there a marginally
significant slope (10% level). Moreover, in the robustness checks analysis in Section 5, we
address the potential endogeneity issue directly and we find that the main results hold. Hence,
the exogeneity assumption should not be significantly restrictive in our case.
3 Monetary policy effects on corporate bond returns: a simple
regression approach
In this section, we estimate the contemporaneous reaction of monthly excess corporate bond
returns to shocks in the Fed funds rate (FFR). We start with the following baseline regression
model:
xn,t+1 = γ0 + γ1MPt+1 + ut+1, (3)
where xn denotes excess returns on the Barclays corporate bond index with average maturity
18Due to data availability on the macroeconomic surprises, the sample period for these regressions commences
in 1991.10.
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of n, MP represents unexpected changes in the FFR, and u denotes the component of excess
returns that is not explained by monetary policy shocks.
The model is estimated by ordinary least squares, for each of the six Barclays indices that
we consider, that is, long-term and intermediate maturity with AAA, AA, and A ratings. The
t-statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (White, 1980). The
results in Table 4 show that the slope coefficient, γ1, exhibits a negative sign, albeit the full-
sample estimation indicates significance (at the 5 or 10% level) only for the intermediate matu-
rity bonds. However, in the pre-crisis sample, the effect of unexpected FFR changes is strongly
significantly (1% level) negative across all ratings and maturities, thus indicating that excess
corporate returns respond negatively to a tightening shock. In the restricted sample, he respon-
siveness of long-term corporate bond returns to monetary policy shocks is stronger in comparison
to that of intermediate maturity bonds, as indicated by the magnitudes of the slopes. Moreover,
there is a tendency for the reaction of returns to MP to increase in magnitude, albeit not always
monotonically, as we move from higher grade towards lower grade bonds. Hence, lower rating
bonds are more responsive to monetary shocks. The weaker significance levels that we identify
in the full sample can be attributed to the incorporation of the financial crisis in the estima-
tion window. As discussed in Section 2.1, the volatility of bond returns increased significantly
during that period of financial turmoil, leading to some extreme observations. Moreover, the
financial crisis lead the Fed to adopt a very expansionary monetary policy with FFR reaching
the zero-lower bound. These two forces combine to originate a deterioration in the fit of the
empirical model and the statistical significance of the regression slopes. In fact, the R2 estimates
are significantly larger in the restricted sample across all six bond indices.
We proceed by adding several business conditions controls to the regression above in order to
assess the robustness of the baseline findings. These controls include two important indicators
of business conditions proposed by Fama and French (1989), the default spread (def) and the
term spread (term).19 We also include the one-month Treasury bill rate (y). Thus, the following
augmented regression model is estimated:
xn,t+1 = γ0 + γ1MPt+1 + γ2deft+1 + γ3termt+1 + γ4yt+1 + vt+1, (4)
The results in Table 5 indicate that, with the exception of the default spread (in the pre-
crisis sample), business conditions proxies tend not to be statistically significant in terms of
19These variables are also used as risk factors that help to price cross-sectional bond risk premia (see Fama and
French (1993) and Gebhardt et al. (2005)).
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explaining contemporaneous excess bond returns. Furthermore, the main findings from the
baseline estimations remain robust. In the full sample, the impact of FFR shocks on excess
bond returns is negative and statistically significant only in the case of intermediate maturity
bonds, which is consistent with the evidence from the univariate regressions discussed previously
(although there is stronger significance (1% level) in comparison to the univariate regressions).
When the financial crisis and its aftermath are excluded from the sample period, we find that
the monetary policy effect is always highly significant (1% level), similarly to the univariate
regressions. As the rating declines and maturity increases, the sensitivity of bond returns to
FFR surprises tends to rise, also in line with the results for the single regressions. Overall, the
empirical findings in this section are indicative of a negative contemporaneous reaction of excess
corporate bond returns to monetary tightening shocks.
4 Monetary policy effects on corporate bond returns: a VAR-
based approach
In this section, we use an empirical framework that decomposes corporate bond excess returns
to their fundamental components in an effort to explain the negative reaction of bond premia
to monetary policy shocks, documented in the last section.
4.1 Components of realized excess bond returns
Modifying the zero-coupon bond framework of Campbell and Ammer (1993) for the case of
coupon paying bonds, we can decompose current period unexpected excess bond returns into
news about future excess bond returns and short-term interest rates:
x˜n,t+1 = (Et+1 − Et)
− n−1∑
j=1
ρjxn−j,t+1+j −
n−1∑
j=1
ρjyt+1+j
 = −x˜x,t+1 − x˜y,t+1, (5)
where x˜n,t+1 ≡ (Et+1 − Et)xn,t+1 represents the unexpected one-period log return on a n-
period bond (or equivalently a bond index with an average maturity of n periods) in excess
of the continuously compounded one-period nominal risk-free rate; x˜x,t+1 denotes revisions in
expectations regarding future excess bond returns (discount rate news); and x˜y,t+1 denotes
revisions in expectations about the future log nominal short-term risk free rate (interest rate
news).20 The intermediate maturity Barclays corporate bond index has an average maturity
20In Appendix A, we provide more details on the derivation. For a decomposition of consol bonds, see Engsted
and Tanggaard (2001) and Abhyankar and Gonzalez (2009).
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of 5 years, while that of the long-term index is 24 years. Hence, for intermediate maturity
bonds we set n=60 months, while for long-term bonds n=288. ρ is the linearization constant,
a number marginally smaller than one, which is linked to the average yield to maturity of each
bond index.21
Equation (5) is a dynamic accounting identity that arises from the definition of bond returns
and imposes internal consistency on expectations. It is not a behavioural model containing
economic theory and asset pricing assumptions and implications. The decomposition implies
that negative unexpected excess bond returns must be associated with increases in expected
future excess returns during the life of the bond, rises in expected future short-term interest
rates, or a combination of these two effects. We do not include a term associated with default
losses, as in Nozawa (2017), since our empirical analysis focuses on high quality corporate bonds.
Specifically, for the AAA, AA, and A rating categories under consideration the historical average
default rates are almost zero (see Table 3 in Standard&Poors, 2015).
From Equation (5), it follows that the total variance of unexpected excess bond returns can
be decomposed into the sum of the two variances plus the covariance term:
V ar [x˜n,t+1] = V ar [x˜x,t+1] + V ar [x˜y,t+1] + 2Cov [x˜x,t+1, x˜y,t+1] . (6)
In order to evaluate the relative importance of discount rate news and interest rate news, we
normalise each of the variance and covariance terms in Equation (6) by the total variability of
excess returns. The delta method is used to calculate the standard errors for the weights of the
terms of the variance decomposition since these represent nonlinear functions of the estimated
VAR parameters (see Campbell and Ammer, 1993; Barr and Pesaran, 1997; Bernanke and
Kuttner, 2005).
The implementation of the decomposition requires empirical proxies for the unobserved
components of excess bond returns. Following Campbell and Ammer (1993), we link these
multiperiod expectations to the stationary dynamics of a vector autoregressive model (VAR).
Specifically, a first-order VAR is employed, which contains excess bond returns, the one-month
Treasury bill rate, and other variables that help to forecast changes in bond premia:
zt+1 = θ +Azt +wt+1, (7)
21We set ρ = 1
1+Yn
, where Yn is the average yield to maturity of a given bond index. The average value
of ρ used in the estimations is 0.9946, ranging from 0.9939 in the case of long-term A bonds to 0.9952 for
intermediate maturity AAA bonds. These values are based upon the full sample information. We also calculated
the corresponding ρ using pre-crisis data and used these values for pre-crisis estimations. The results remain
largely unchanged and are available upon request.
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where θ is a vector of intercept terms, zt is a vector of endogenous state variables, A denotes
a matrix of VAR parameters, and wt+1 is a vector of forecasting residuals. In the benchmark
VAR the state vector is given by zt+1 = [xn,t+1, deft+1, termt+1, yt+1]
′, where all the variables
are defined as in Section 3.
The forecast errors and the estimated parameters from the VAR model can be used to
compute unexpected excess bond returns and the two news components identified in Equation
(6) as follows:
x˜n,t+1 ≡ xn,t+1 − Et[xn,t+1] = s′1wt+1, (8)
x˜x,t+1 ≡ (Et+1 − Et)
n−1∑
j=1
ρjxn−j,t+1+j = s′1(I− ρA)−1(ρA− ρnAn)wt+1, (9)
x˜y,t+1 ≡ (Et+1 − Et)
n−1∑
j=1
ρjyt+1+j = −x˜n,t+1 − x˜x,t+1, (10)
where s′1 is a selection vector that assigns the first element of the state vector to 1, and I is the
identity matrix.
Equation (8) shows that unexpected excess bond returns represent the residuals from the
VAR forecasting model for excess returns. Discount rate news are computed directly from
the VAR estimates using Equation (9). Interest rate news are the residual component, that
is, we employ Equation (10) to compute them using the dynamic accounting identity and the
estimate of discount rate news. This procedure is in line with previous studies that conduct bond
returns’ decompositions (Engsted and Tanggaard, 2001; Abhyankar and Gonzalez, 2009; Bredin
et al., 2010). In the robustness checks section, we show that our results are not sensitive to an
alternative identification scheme where discount rate news become the residual component of the
bond premium decomposition. We should also note that some modelling noise may be present
since the Barclays indices are rebalanced to maintain their specified maturity, while the return
decomposition in Equation (5) implies that maturity shrinks as time passes and j increases
(Engsted et al., 2012). Chen and Zhao (2009) argue that such modelling noise is not likely to
be empirically important. In the robustness analysis, we also implement a decomposition for
long-term bonds using the formulas for consol bonds, where the problem of shrinking maturity
does not arise, and show that our results do not change in a significant way.
The VAR model that is used to extract news is assumed to contain all relevant information
that investors may have when forming expectations about the future. If investors have additional
information that is not present in the state vector, the relative importance of the residual
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component may be overstated.22 The presence of the default spread and term spread in the
state vector is consistent with previous work (Chen and Zhao, 2009; Keim and Stambaugh,
1986; Fama and French, 1989; Greenwood and Hanson, 2013).23 In the robustness analysis, we
show that our baseline findings are robust to the incorporation of additional macro-financial
predictor variables in the VAR state vector.
Table 6 presents the estimates of the excess return forecasting equation in the benchmark
VAR for the six Barclays indices. The results can be summarised as follows. First, the one-month
ahead forecasting power of the VAR is quite reasonable. Apart from the long-maturity AAA
bond index (with an explanatory ratio below 2%), the adjusted R2 values lie within the range
of 3.7–7.2% in the full sample estimation, which is in line with previous evidence from bond
predictability studies. In the pre-crisis sample, the amount of predictability for long-maturity
bonds (AA and A indices) is significantly smaller, yet for intermediate bonds the corresponding
range in explanatory ratios is between 4.6% and 5.6%.24 Hence, the forecasting power tends to
be higher in the case of intermediate maturity bonds and tends to decline with the bond rating
(albeit this second effect is less clear in the restricted sample). Second, with the exception of the
default spread, which is only occasionally significant (10% level) in the full sample estimation,
the other two predictors are performing quite well in terms of predicting bond risk premia.
In agreement with Chen and Zhao (2009) and Baker et al. (2003), we find that future excess
bond returns are positively related to the current short-term interest rate and the term spread.
Third, long-term bonds exhibit stronger sensitivities to these two predictors (as indicated by
the respective slopes) in comparison to intermediate maturity bonds, while the pattern is less
clear when we move from higher to lower credit rating. Fourth, there is relevant time-series
momentum (positive auto-correlation) for the returns of middle-maturity bonds.25
The variance decomposition results are shown in Table 7. The key finding is that across
bonds with different maturities and credit ratings, discount rate news typically constitute the
major component of shocks in current excess bond returns. More specifically, the shares of
22Campbell and Ammer (1993) point out that the sign of the possible bias is uncertain since it will depend on
the covariances between state variables and any omitted variables.
23Baker et al. (2003), Abhyankar and Gonzalez (2009), and Lin et al. (2017) add inflation and/or the real
interest rate in the list of potential predictors.
24This level of fit compares favorably with similar studies (based on multiple regressions) of one-month ahead
predictability of the stock market return (Goyal and Santa-Clara, 2003; Campbell and Vuolteenaho, 2004; Welch
and Goyal, 2008; Maio and Santa-Clara, 2012; Maio, 2013a; Maio, 2013b).
25The estimated VARs are dynamically stable since no root lies outside the unit circle. The results from the
forecasting equations of the other variables are available upon request. In short, they indicate that the short-term
interest rate is predicted by the default spread, the term spread, and its own lag, with a high AR(1) coefficient.
The default spread is a highly persistent process. The term spread is very persistent too, but also related to the
lagged default spread. The adjusted R2 values for the default spread and term spread regressions vary between
82% and 94%.
15
bond premia news vary between 55% (for long-term AAA bonds) and 107% (for intermediate
AA bonds) in the full sample, while the range in the restricted sample is between 85% (for
long AAA and A bonds) and 107% (intermediate AA bonds). Moreover, most of these point
estimates are statistically significant (the sole exception is the case of intermediate A bonds in
the full sample in which case the estimated weight is not significant at the 10% level ). These
weights also tend to be larger for intermediate relative to long maturity bonds in both samples.
Yet, with regards to the relationship between discount rate shares and credit ratings the results
are not consistent over time: while in the full sample the weights tend to decrease with credit
rating (although not monotonically), there is a less clear pattern over the restricted sample. We
can also conclude that the shares of discount rate news tend to be larger in the shorter sample
in comparison to the full sample.
Across the board, interest rate news assumes less importance than bond premia news. For
example, the corresponding weights in the pre-crisis period vary between 10% (long AAA bonds)
and 44% (intermediate AA bonds). The shares associated with interest rate news are larger
in the full sample, ranging between 21% (long A bonds) and 71% (intermediate AA bonds),
however these estimates are still clearly below the corresponding shares for bond premia news.
Moreover, several estimates for the share of interest rate news are not significant at the 10%
level. On the other hand, although the covariance term between interest rate news and discount
rate news appears relatively sizeable for some categories of bonds, they are always statistically
insignificant.
In sum, our results for corporate bonds strongly support the importance of discount rate
news, as a driver of the total variability of returns, in agreement with studies that conduct
variance decomposition for stocks at the market level (Campbell, 1991; Campbell and Ammer,
1993; Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; Maio, 2014; Maio and Philip, 2015). On the other hand,
previous studies on Treasuries find that inflation news is the main component of unexpected
excess bond returns (Campbell and Ammer, 1993; Engsted and Tanggaard, 2007; Kontonikas
et al., 2015). These results provide additional evidence on the distinct behavior of Treasury and
corporate bond returns.
4.2 Explaining the impact of monetary policy shocks on bond returns
In order to explain the source of the corporate bond market’s reaction to monetary policy shocks,
we estimate the effect of these shocks in unexpected excess bond returns and also their three
components. To do so, we follow Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and include unexpected FFR
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changes as an exogenous variable in the VAR model:
zt+1 = θ +Azt + φMPt+1 + ωt+1, (11)
where φ is a vector that includes the state variables response parameters to contemporaneous
monetary policy shocks. The original VAR error vector (wt+1) is essentially decomposed in a
component related to the monetary policy actions, φMPt+1, and a component related to other
information, ωt+1. Following Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005, we proceed by estimating the original
VAR model to obtain estimates of A and then regress the VAR residuals vector on monetary
policy shocks in order to estimate φ. The monetary policy impact on the contemporaneous
unexpected excess bond returns, discount rate news, and interest rate news can be calculated
using Equations (12)-(14), respectively:
x˜MPn,t+1 =
∂x˜n,t+1
∂MPt+1
= s′1φ, (12)
x˜MPx,t+1 =
∂x˜x,t+1
∂MPt+1
= s′1(I− ρA)−1(ρA− ρnAn)φ, (13)
x˜MPy,t+1 =
∂x˜y,t+1
∂MPt+1
= −x˜MPn,t+1 − x˜MPx,t+1. (14)
Thus, the response of excess bond returns and their components to monetary policy shocks
depends both on φ and the dynamics of the VAR through the VAR coefficient matrix, A. As
in Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), the delta method is used to compute standard errors for these
responses to monetary shocks.
Table 8 presents the results. In the full sample, the total response of unexpected excess
bond returns to shocks in FFR is negative and almost always statistically significant. The sole
exception is for long-term AAA bonds, in which case the negative slope is not significant at the
10% level. Excluding the recent financial crisis and its aftermath, the effect of policy shocks
becomes strongly significant (1% level) across all ratings and maturities. These results imply
that unexpected excess bond returns respond negatively to a monetary tightening shock and
are consistent with the results for excess bond returns (univariate regressions) in Section 3 (the
main difference being that the significance of the monetary responses improves sharply in the
full sample). Mirroring the results from the univariate regression estimates, in the pre-crisis
sample the monetary policy effect on long-term corporate bond returns is always stronger (as
indicated by the magnitudes of the respective slopes) than the effect on intermediate maturity
bonds. However, for the full sample we get an opposite relation. Furthermore, in both samples
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the total response of unexpected excess bond returns to policy shocks increases in magnitude
as the credit rating deteriorates (again, these results are in line with the univariate regression
analysis in Section 3).
Moving on to the reaction of the components of excess bond returns, we start the discussion
with the findings for the pre-crisis period, which are more clear-cut. The results show that the
effect of monetary policy shocks is basically explained though the discount rate news channel.
For all bond indices, tightening shocks negatively affect contemporaneous unexpected excess
corporate bond returns through an increase in expected bond returns. In all cases the estimates
of x˜MPx,t+1 are strongly significant (1% level), while the policy impact on interest rate news is not
statistically significant in any case. The share of bond premia news in the total (absolute) return
response tends to be stronger for bonds with higher credit rating. In the intermediate maturity
group, for example, discount rate news contribute towards 86% (1.96/2.29) of the response of
excess returns on AAA bonds to a policy shock, while the corresponding figure for A bonds is
66% (1.87/2.82). In the case of long-maturity AAA and A bonds the corresponding estimates
are 92% and 79%, respectively.26 We also observe that the estimates of x˜MPx,t+1 are larger among
long maturity in comparison to intermediate maturity bonds, mirroring the direction observed
in the magnitudes of the total return responses.27 This dominant role of discount rate news in
explaining the response of excess corporate bond returns to monetary shocks is in agreement
with the evidence of Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) for the stock market.
With regards to the full sample results, we note that the incorporation of the financial crisis
in the estimation window leads to much less precise estimates of discount rate news reaction to
policy shocks. Indeed, only for the highest rating category (long and intermediate AAA bonds)
are the bond premia responses statistically significant. In contrast with the results for the
restricted sample, the monetary effects on interest rate news (x˜MPy,t+1) are statistically significant
for most bond categories (the exceptions are the long AAA and AA indices). It turns out that for
most bond indices the largest magnitudes (and shares) of responses are associated with interest
rate news, particularly among intermediate maturity bonds. Out of the six bond indices only in
one case (long AAA bonds) does the discount-rate channel dominate the interest rate channel
when it comes to explain the total return loading on monetary shocks (in the case of long AA
bonds both shares have a similar magnitude and are statistically insignificant). Hence, in the full
26In the case of intermediate maturity bonds, the relationship between credit quality and the share of bond
premia news in the total return response is monotonic.
27We should note that larger weights of bond premia news on excess bond returns (as calculated in Table 7)
does not necessarily imply larger estimates of x˜MPx,t+1. For example, long-maturity bonds tend to have smaller
shares of V ar[x˜x] (see Table 7), despite having larger policy effects on bond premia news than middle-maturity
bonds.
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sample period we find that interest rate news outweigh discount-rate news in terms of explaining
the effect of monetary shocks on most corporate bond returns and this trend is especially notable
among lower rating bonds. This decline in the importance of the bond premia channel should
be related with the 2007–09 financial crisis. Indeed, there was a significant spike in the volatility
of bond returns during the recent financial crisis, especially relevant among lower-rating bonds.
This event, combined with the very expansionary monetary policy that forced FFR to reach
the zero-lower bound, are the likely causes of the smaller effect of policy shocks on bond premia
news. More specifically, both events should have contributed to the decline in the total bond
return responses to monetary policy shocks. On the other hand, the increased volatility in credit
markets (that affects not only the bond returns but also some of the VAR state variables) is
likely the main cause behind the smaller weight of discount rate news (over total bond returns)
and the smaller correlation between bond premia news and policy shocks registered over the full
sample.28
Overall, the VAR-based results strongly favour discount rate news in being the key driver
of the response of excess bond returns to monetary policy shocks in the pre-crisis period, with
monetary tightening negatively affecting contemporaneous returns through higher expected re-
turns. However, the results also indicate that recently this channel have become more subdued,
especially among lower-rating and lower maturity bonds, which should be a consequence of the
recent financial crisis.
4.3 Stock market response to monetary policy shocks
To provide further evidence on the impact of the financial crisis on our results, we estimate the
stock market reaction to monetary policy shocks. Specifically, following Bernanke and Kuttner
(2005) and Maio (2014), we compute the contemporaneous effect of monetary policy shocks on
the excess stock market return and its components: discount rate news (equity premia), cash
flows news, and interest rate news. Our VAR state vector includes the term spread, default
spread, the one-month Treasury bill rate (as in the benchmark VAR for bond returns presented
above) in addition to the excess market return and the dividend yield.29 30
28The magnitude of discount-rate news is an increased function of both the persistence of the VAR state variables
and the magnitudes of the respective coefficients in the VAR equation associated with excess bond returns (first
row of A) as discussed in Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) and Chen and Zhao (2009). The results in Table 6
show that the slopes associated with the lagged Treasury bill rate tend to be lower in the full sample. Moreover,
unreported results show the persistence of the term spread is slightly lower in the full sample.
29The dividend yield is a key predictor of the equity premium and hence we include it in the VAR in line with
the related literature (Campbell and Shiller, 1988; Campbell and Ammer, 1993; Campbell and Vuolteenaho, 2004;
Cochrane, 2008; Maio, 2013a, 2014; Campbell et al., 2017).
30In line with previous work (Campbell and Vuolteenaho, 2004; Maio, 2013a; Maio, 2014), the log-linearization
parameter ρ is set to 0.951/12.
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Untabulated results show that the total stock return response is significantly smaller in the
full sample that includes the financial crisis (-6.83 vs. -8.55 in the restricted sample). Moreover,
the impact on discount rate news is also significantly smaller, and less precisely estimates, in the
full sample (3.35 vs. 5.30 in the restricted sample). Yet, the discount rate channel dominates
the cash-flow channel in both the full (cash-flow response of -2.41) and restricted sample (-2.24),
in line with the evidence presented in Bernanke and Kuttner (2005).
From these results it follows that over the restricted sample the negative correlation be-
tween stock market returns and monetary policy shocks works mainly trough the discount-rate
channel. Second, the total return response (as well as the effect on equity premia news) has
been significantly attenuated after the financial crisis. This stems from the already mentioned
structural change in the Fed policy but also from the significant hike in stock market volatility
during the 2007-09 period. Hence, these results are in line with those obtained for corporate
bonds, as discussed above, and confirm that these two asset classes are highly correlated. On
the other hand, these results also reinforce that the shift in monetary policy had a severe impact
on the way that asset markets in general, not only in corporate bond markets, respond to those
shocks. Thus, it is quite unlikely that the high volatility in corporate bond markets in recent
years is the only force driving our results discussed above.
5 Robustness checks
We examine the robustness of our key VAR-based empirical findings in a number of ways and
find that the results reported in Section 4 are overall not sensitive to these changes. First, we use
alternative state vector specifications for the underlying VAR model. Second, we consider higher-
order VARs. Third, we use the consol bond formulas to conduct the variance decomposition for
returns on long-term corporate bonds. Fourth, we consider an alternative identification scheme
for the components of excess bond returns. Fifth, we use lagged FFR shocks as an exogenous
variable in the VAR and also employ the methodology suggested by Romer and Romer (2004)
to calculate monetary policy shocks. Finally, we account for risk premia in the FFR futures
contracts. To save space, we only present results for the pre-crisis period. The results are
presented in Appendix B.
5.1 Alternative state vector specifications
The state variables in the VAR are chosen on the basis of their predictive power for excess bond
returns. The benchmark VAR state vector includes excess bond returns, the default spread,
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the term spread, and the one-month Treasury bill rate. Here, we augment the state vector by
additional macro-financial indicators that may help to forecast bond returns. Specifically, the
following variables are considered in turn: the log dividend-to-price ratio on the S&P 500 stock
market index, the Chicago Fed Adjusted National Financial Conditions Index (ANFCI), and
the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI). CFNAI is a proxy of overall economic activ-
ity, calculated as the weighted average of 85 monthly indicators of national economic activity.
ANFCI isolates the component of financial conditions (in money, debt, and equity markets, in
addition to the traditional and “shadow” banking systems) that is uncorrelated with economic
conditions.31 Generally, the baseline VAR findings are robust to the inclusion of additional
macro-financial state variables. The positive effect of monetary policy easing on excess bond
returns mainly comes from a corresponding negative effect on the future bond risk premium.
5.2 Higher-order VAR models
The main empirical analysis is based on the first-order VAR model. Nevertheless, one may argue
that this specification could be too restrictive and not adequate to capture the dynamic structure
of the data. Therefore, we also consider higher-order VARs as in other related studies (Campbell
and Ammer, 1993; Maio, 2014). The empirical estimations are repeated using VAR(2), VAR(3),
and VAR(6) models. The state vector remains the same as in the benchmark VAR(1) model. The
results are similar across different lags structure, hence, we only report the estimates obtained
using VAR(3) in order to preserve space. Overall, the baseline findings regarding the key role
played by discount rate news in terms of explaining the response of excess bond returns to
monetary policy shifts during the pre-crisis period is not affected by the alternative VAR order.
5.3 The case of consol bonds
Some related studies apply the VAR-based decomposition method for long-term bonds assuming
infinite maturity, i.e. the empirical analysis is based on consol (perpetual) bonds (Engsted and
Tanggaard, 2007; Bredin et al., 2010). One obvious advantage of this approach is that the
problem of shrinking bond maturity over time is not relevant when calculating future excess
bond returns directly from the estimated VAR. Here, we apply the methodology and formulas
as provided in Bredin et al. (2010) on the long-term corporate bonds using the same data
as before. In line with our benchmark analysis, we extract interest rate news as a residual
31The calculation of the market-wide log dividend-to-price ratio is based on data provided by Robert J. Shiller
at: http://www.econ.yale.edu/ shiller/data.htm. The ANFCI and CFNAI indices are obtained from the FREDII
database.
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component using the dynamic identity relationship. The results are nearly identical to those for
long-term bonds discussed in the previous section. Hence, our approach of assuming long-term
bonds as n-maturity bonds does not lead to different findings. This also implies that our results
are not driven by the fact that we do not account for shrinking bond maturity over time.
5.4 Alternative identification scheme for excess returns components
We examine whether a different identification scheme has implications for our main findings.
The interest rate news component is now estimated directly from the first-order VAR while the
discount rate news is calculated as the residual term. The baseline findings are non-sensitive to
this alternative identification scheme. As in the benchmark case, the contemporaneous reaction
of bond returns to monetary policy shocks can be attributed to shifts in expected bond returns
over the restricted sample.
5.5 Revisiting endogeneity
We address the potentially endogenous nature of our monetary policy indicator in two ways.
First, we use the one-period lagged monetary policy shock as an exogenous variable in the
VAR to deal with potential simultaneity. Second, we follow the methodology proposed by
Romer and Romer (2004) to identify monetary policy shocks that take into account the central
bank’s response to expected economic conditions. The calculation of Romer and Romers (2004)
monetary policy shocks involves two steps. First, intended federal funds rate changes around
the FOMC meetings are identified. Second, the intended funds rate changes are regressed on the
internal FOMC forecasts for inflation and real economic activity, i.e. the Greenbook forecasts,
around the dates of these forecasts; see Equation (1) in Romer and Romer (2004). Residuals from
that regression represent monetary policy shocks. The results from these estimations provide
insights that are qualitatively similar with the baseline findings concerning the important role
of discount rate news in driving policy effects on bond returns.
5.6 Risk premium-adjusted monetary policy shocks
We use risk-adjusted futures contracts rates as a measure of monetary policy expectations follow-
ing Cenesizoglu and Essid (2012). The excess returns on FFR futures contracts are calculated
as the difference between the rate implied by the one-month-ahead Fed funds future at the
end of the previous month and the average actual effective Fed funds rate in that month. We
regress excess returns on a constant and the NBER recession dummy and then deduct the fitted
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value from that regression from the futures contract rate. Next, we use these adjusted series
to compute the monetary policy shocks in Equation (1). The results that we obtain using the
risk-adjusted monetary policy shocks are similar to the baseline findings.
6 The role of term and credit risk premia news
In this section, we compute an alternative bond return decomposition, which disentangles bond
premia news into one component related to term premia and another component related with
credit premia.
The two-way decomposition that we presented in Equation (5) can be expanded by separating
the credit risk premium and term premium component of discount rate news. To do so, we
express excess bond returns as follows:
xn,t+1 = x
C
n,t+1 + x
G
n,t+1, (15)
where xCn,t+1 denotes the return on (a n-maturity) corporate bond in excess of the return on
a Treasury bond with similar maturity, and xGn,t+1 denotes the excess Treasury bond return
relative to the short-term risk-free rate.32 Using Equation (15), Equation (5) becomes:
x˜n,t+1 = (Et+1 − Et)
− n−1∑
j=1
ρjxCn−j,t+1+j −
n−1∑
j=1
ρjxGn−j,t+1+j −
n−1∑
j=1
ρjyt+1+j
⇔ (16)
x˜n,t+1 = −x˜Cx,t+1 − x˜Gx,t+1 − x˜y,t+1. (17)
Hence, current period unexpected excess bond returns are decomposed into news about
future credit risk premia (x˜Cx,t+1), news about future term premia (x˜
G
x,t+1), as well as interest
rate news.33
The variance decomposition results corresponding to the expanded set of news components
are shown in Table 9. The key finding is that the role of term premium news is overall more
crucial relative to that of news about credit risk premia. For example, during the pre-crisis period
it follows that more than 50% (between 59% and 71%) of the variance of excess return innovations
can be attributed to term premium news across all six bond categories. In comparison the shares
associated with credit risk premia are below 15% (between 1% and 13%) in all cases, and none
of these estimates are statistically significant at the 10% level. On the other hand, the weights
32The source of the Treasuries data (five-year and twenty-year Treasury bond indices) is CRSP.
33In Appendix C, we provide details on the derivation and the identification of the news terms from VAR
estimates.
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corresponding to interest rate news are statistically significant in the case of long-maturity bonds,
but the magnitudes are substantially smaller than those attached to term premia news. When
we consider the full sample period, the estimates for the share of term premia news are smaller
and less precisely estimated (especially among intermediate maturity bonds).
Table 10 presents the monetary policy effects by using the alternative bond return decompo-
sition. In line with the benchmark findings of Section 4, the full sample results do not provide
significant evidence in support of risk premia as a factor that can explain the response of bond
returns to monetary policy shocks: the estimated effects on both credit premia and term premia
news are insignificant in most cases, the sole exception being the term premia policy response
associated with the long AAA index (significant at the 10% level).
The pre-crisis estimates, however, indicate that risk premia play a crucial role. Specifically,
term premium news constitute the most relevant component across the different maturities and
credit ratings: the response estimates vary between 1.65 (intermediate AAA bonds) and 2.79
(long A bonds) and these estimates are significant (1% level) in all six cases. On the other hand,
the shares corresponding to credit premia news have substantially smaller magnitudes and are
insignificant for all six bonds. Specifically, the share of term premium news in the total response
of intermediate maturity AAA bonds is 72% (1.65/2.28) while that of credit risk premium news
is only 11% (0.24/2.28). In the case of intermediate A bonds, the corresponding shares are
59% and 6%, respectively. The weights associated with interest rate news are similar to the
corresponding estimates in the benchmark decomposition (only in the case of the long A bonds
are these estimates estimates statistically significant).
Therefore, our findings strongly suggest that the reaction of the higher quality segment (AAA
to A ratings) of the corporate bond market to monetary policy shocks over the 1989–2007 period
is primarily related to risk premium revisions, which in turn are related with the slope of the
yield curve instead of credit risk.
7 Conclusion
There is a vast amount of literature on the monetary policy implications for asset prices. Gen-
erally, stock and government bond markets have been the focus of the attention while there is
significantly less empirical work carried out with respect to corporate bonds. The aim of this
paper is to examine whether conventional U.S. monetary policy, measured by FFR shocks, has
any implications for corporate bond returns and their components. Our analysis is timely since
the Fed is in the process of normalising monetary conditions following a prolonged period of
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ultra-loose monetary policy. Moreover, we shed some light on the impact of the recent financial
crisis on the empirical relationship between corporate bond market movements and monetary
policy actions. To start, we simply regress monthly excess bond returns on a monetary policy
indicator to provide an estimation of the respective contemporaneous correlation. Next, we
adapt the log-linear return decomposition framework of Campbell and Ammer (1993) together
with a first-order VAR model to decompose the monetary policy effects on unexpected excess
bond returns in terms of their two components: discount rate news and interest rate news.
By conducting simple regressions over the 1989.02–2013.12 and 1989.02–2007.07 periods,
we obtain a negative and significant response of excess returns on corporate bonds to shocks
in FFR prior to the financial crisis. This conclusion remains valid across both medium and
longer maturities as well as across different credit ratings. The effect of monetary policy on
bond returns is weaker and less significant in the full sample, indicating potential implications
of the financial crisis and the subsequent change in the Fed’s policy stance. Similar results are
obtained when we examine monetary policy effects on unexpected excess bond returns, which
are obtained from a first-order VAR.
With respect to the bond return variance decomposition, our results demonstrate that the
key determinant of the variability in current unexpected excess returns on long-term and in-
termediate term corporate bonds is the variation in the revisions in expectations about future
bond risk premia. The other component of excess bond returns (interest rate news) plays only a
limited role. These results holds across all three credit ratings considered, and are also robust to
the 2007–2009 financial crisis. More importantly, for the pre-crisis period we provide evidence
that discount rate news constitute the key driving force that explains the response of bond re-
turns to monetary shocks. In other words, the largest share of the contemporaneous negative
response of corporate bond returns to monetary policy tightening can be attributed to higher
expected excess bond returns (higher bond risk premia). In terms of explaining the negative
effect of interest rate rises on current returns, the impact of monetary shocks on expectations of
future short-term interest rates is relatively small. Thus, our results suggest that an important
channel via which monetary policy affects corporate bonds operates through discount rate news.
These results are robust across the six bond indices analyzed, however, some relevant differences
across these bond categories exist.
The results for the full sample that includes the recent financial turmoil (2007–2009) are
rather different. During this period, across most of the bond indices considered, upward revisions
in future short-term interest rates can explain the negative bond return responses to monetary
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tightening shocks. The bond premia channel is significantly less relevant, compared to the
interest rate channel, in explaining the impact of Fed policy on bond returns. These results
should be a consequence of two facts that originated in the recent financial crisis. First, the
significant increase in corporate bond price volatility, and the widening of credit spreads. Second,
the change in Fed policy by adopting a ultra-expansionary stance which led the Fed funds target
to the zero-lower bound (along with the adoption of unconventional policies, involving new
interventions in credit and bond markets). Both events probably lead to significant outliers in
the relationship between FFR shocks and corporate bond returns, and the estimation of the
bond return decomposition. This could be relevant to explain the significant attenuation of the
impact of policy shocks on bond premia news when the most recent period is included in the
sample.
In the last part of the paper, we compute an alternative bond return decomposition, which
disentangles bond premia news into one component related to term premia news and another
component related with credit premia news. Our findings clearly suggest that the reaction of the
corporate bond market to monetary policy shifts is primarily related to risk premium revisions
that are related with the slope of the yield curve (term premia news) rather than related to
credit risk (credit premia news). Hence, term premia plays a more important role in driving
expected bond returns, at least in what concerns the reaction to monetary policy surprises.
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A Bond return decomposition and VAR identification
This appendix provides a summary of the key steps for the decomposition of unexpected ex-
cess bond returns in terms of news components and the VAR-based empirical identification.
The starting point is the definition of bond returns. The gross nominal holding-period return
(1 + Rn,t+1) on an n-period coupon bond, or equivalently a bond index with n-period average
maturity, from t to t+ 1 is
1 +Rn,t+1 =
Pn−1,t+1 + C
Pn,t
, (A1)
where Pn,t denotes the bond price at period t and C is the respective coupon. By taking logs
on both sides of Equation (A1), we obtain the log nominal holding-period return:
rn,t+1 = pn−1,t+1 − pn,t + ln
(
1 + ec−pn−1,t+1
)
, (A2)
where p = ln(P ) and c = ln(C) denote the log price and log coupon, respectively. The non-linear
term, ln (1 + ec−pn−1,t+1), can be approximated around the mean of the log coupon-price ratio,
c− p, by using a first-order Taylor expansion. Consequently, we have:
rn,t+1 ≈ k + ρpn−1,t+1 + (1− ρ)c− pn,t, (A3)
where k = − ln(ρ) − (1 − ρ) ln
(
1
ρ − 1
)
and ρ = 1
1+ec−p
≈ 1
1+Yn
. Yn is the average yield to
maturity of the bond. This definition of ρ gives a good approximation for returns on bonds
selling close to par (Campbell et al., 1997).
By re-arranging Equation (A3), solving forward, and taking expectations at time t, we can
express the log price in terms of expected future returns and coupon payments:
pn,t = Et
n−1∑
j=0
ρj [k + (1− ρ)c− rn−j,t+1+j)] . (A4)
By using (A4) and (A3), we obtain an expression for current unexpected bond returns, in
which this variable is negatively related to revisions in expectations of future bond returns:
rn,t+1 − Et[rn,t+1] = −(Et+1 − Et)
n−1∑
j=1
ρjxn−j,t+1+j
 . (A5)
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On the other hand, excess bond returns are defined as follows:
xn,t+1 = rn,t+1 − yt+1, (A6)
where yt+1 is the log nominal short-term risk-free rate.
We can then re-write Equation (A6) in terms of excess returns and obtain the following
equation, which decomposes unexpected excess bond returns (x˜n,t+1) into discount rate news
(x˜x,t+1) and interest rate news (x˜y,t+1):
x˜n,t+1 = xn,t+1 − Et[xn,t+1] = (Et+1 − Et)
− n−1∑
j=1
ρjxn−j,t+1+j −
n−1∑
j=1
ρjyt+1+j

= −x˜x,t+1 − x˜y,t+1,
(A7)
where x˜x,t+1 = (Et+1 − Et)
∑n−1
j=1 ρ
jxn−j,t+1+j , and x˜y,t+1 = (Et+1 − Et)
∑n−1
j=1 ρ
jyt+1+j .
In order to obtain empirical proxies for unexpected excess bond returns and their (news-
related) components, we employ the VAR approach widely used in the literature (Campbell,
1991). Consider a first-order VAR model:
zt+1 = θ +Azt +wt+1, (A8)
where the VAR state vector is given by zt+1 = [xn,t+1, deft+1, termt+1, yt+1]
′. xn denotes excess
bond returns; def denotes the default spread; term is the term spread; and y is the continuously
compounded one-month Treasury bill rate. θ is a vector of intercept terms, A denotes a matrix
of VAR parameters, and wt+1 is a vector of forecasting residuals.
The unexpected one-period excess bond return at time t + 1 (x˜n,t+1) is directly obtainable
from the first equation of the VAR system:
x˜n,t+1 = xn,t+1 − Et[xn,t+1] = s′1wt+1, (A9)
where s′i is a unit selection vector with i representing the i
th equation in the VAR model, and
accordingly the ith element of the vector is set to 1. Hence, s′1 = [1, 0, 0, 0] selects the residuals
of the first equation in the VAR (excess bond return equation) as a proxy for the unexpected
excess bond return.
Projections from the error vector are used to empirically approximate revisions in expecta-
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tions about future excess returns:
(Et+1 − Et)zt+1+j = Ajwt+1. (A10)
It can then be shown that discount rate news can be expressed in terms of the VAR estimates:
x˜x,t+1 = (Et+1−Et)
n−1∑
j=1
ρjxn−j,t+1+j = s′1
n−1∑
j=1
ρjAj(zt+1−θ−Azt) = s′1
n−1∑
j=1
(ρA)jwt+1. (A11)
By using the geometric series properties, we obtain the following expression for discount rate
news:
x˜x,t+1 = s
′
1(I− ρA)−1(ρA− ρnAn)wt+1, (A12)
where I is the identity matrix.
Finally, we obtain interest rate news as the residual component from the dynamic identity
in Equation (A7):
x˜y,t+1 = −x˜n,t+1 − x˜x,t+1. (A13)
B Additional results
This appendix describes the tables that contain the results of the robustness section (Section
5) in the paper. Tables A.1-A.3 report the monetary policy impact on the unexpected excess
bond returns and its respective components employing alternative state vectors. Table A.4
presents results based upon a higher order, VAR(3), model. The responses associated with a
dynamic decomposition for consol bonds are presented in Table A.5. Table A.6 reports the results
for an alternative identification of excess bond returns. Tables A.7 and A.8 report monetary
policy impact estimates using one-period lagged monetary policy shocks and the shocks that
are calculated using the methodology proposed by Romer and Romer (2004), respectively. The
results from risk-premium adjusted monetary policy shocks are shown in Table A.9.
C Alternative bond return decomposition
We decompose the excess corporate bond return into two components,
xn,t+1 = x
C
n,t+1 + x
G
n,t+1, (C.1)
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where xCn,t+1 denotes the return on (a n-maturity) corporate bond in excess of the return on
a Treasury bond with similar maturity, and xGn,t+1 denotes the excess Treasury bond return
relative to the short-term risk-free rate. By substituting this definition into the decomposition
for the innovation in the current excess corporate bond return, we obtain,
x˜n,t+1 = (Et+1 − Et)
− n−1∑
j=1
ρjxCn−j,t+1+j −
n−1∑
j=1
ρjxGn−j,t+1+j −
n−1∑
j=1
ρjyt+1+j
⇔ (C.2)
x˜n,t+1 = −x˜Cx,t+1 − x˜Gx,t+1 − x˜y,t+1. (C.3)
Under this new decomposition, discount rate news (x˜x,t+1) are decomposed in a component
that reflects only news about future credit risk premia (x˜Cx,t+1) and another component that
reflects entirely news about future term risk premia (x˜Gx,t+1).
To identify the components of the return decomposition presented above, we estimate a
first-order VAR where the state vector is given by
zt+1 = [xn,t+1, x
G
n,t+1, deft+1, termt+1, yt+1]
′, (C.4)
where the variables, other than xGn,t+1, are the same as before.
The three news components are identified as follows:
x˜n,t+1 ≡ xn,t+1 − Et[xn,t+1] = s′1wt+1, (C.5)
x˜Cx,t+1 ≡ (Et+1 − Et)
n−1∑
j=1
ρjxCn−j,t+1+j = (s1 − s2)′(I− ρA)−1(ρA− ρnAn)wt+1, (C.6)
x˜Gx,t+1 ≡ (Et+1 − Et)
n−1∑
j=1
ρjxGn−j,t+1+j = s
′
2(I− ρA)−1(ρA− ρnAn)wt+1, (C.7)
and
x˜y,t+1 ≡ (Et+1 − Et)
n−1∑
j=1
ρjyt+1+j = −x˜n,t+1 − x˜Cx,t+1 − x˜Gx,t+1. (C.8)
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Figure 1: Barclays corporate bond indices
This figure plots the monthly time-series for the following Barclays corporate bond indices: long-
term (L) maturity with A and AAA ratings; intermediate (I) maturity with A and AAA ratings. Shaded
areas denote US recessions as classified by NBER business cycle dates. The series have been normalised
so that they are equal to 100 at the start of the sample period. The sample period is 1989.02-2013.12.
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Figure 2: Monetary policy shocks
This figure plots the monthly time-series for monetary policy shocks (MP ), proxied by the unex-
pected change in the FFR. See Section 2 for more details. Shaded areas denote US recessions as classified
by NBER business cycle dates. The sample period is 1989.02–2013.12.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for monetary policy shocks and VAR state variables
This table presents descriptive statistics for the monetary policy shocks proxy (unexpected change
in the FFR; MP ) and the state variables used in the VAR analysis of Section 4. The state vari-
ables are the excess returns on Barclays corporate bond indices; the default spread (def); the term
spread (term); and the continuously compounded one-month Treasury bill rate (y). The Barclays
indices represent portfolios of long-term (L) and intermediate (I) maturity corporate bonds with AAA,
AA, and A ratings. The full sample period is 1989.02–2013.12 and the pre-crisis period is 1989.02–2007.07.
Mean Stdev. Min. Max. Mean Stdev. Min. Max.
Panel A: Full sample
AAAL 0.37 3.10 −19.26 16.78 def 2.25 0.78 1.25 5.92
AAL 0.47 2.74 −9.90 16.44 term 1.76 1.27 −1.34 4.08
AL 0.44 2.78 −12.76 15.65 y 0.28 0.20 0.00 0.79
AAAI 0.33 1.30 −7.92 5.06 MP −0.03 0.09 −0.63 0.33
AAI 0.34 1.28 −6.80 5.56
AI 0.35 1.46 −11.62 5.46
Panel B: Pre-crisis
AAAL 0.43 2.28 −9.89 6.27 def 1.96 0.51 1.25 3.71
AAL 0.43 2.32 −9.90 6.22 term 1.56 1.33 −1.34 4.08
AL 0.42 2.35 −9.79 6.51 y 0.36 0.16 0.06 0.79
AAAI 0.33 1.21 −4.63 3.42 MP −0.04 0.10 −0.63 0.31
AAI 0.34 1.22 −3.77 3.76
AI 0.33 1.22 −3.29 3.77
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Table 2: Correlation matrix of excess corporate bond returns
This table presents the correlation coefficients for excess returns on Barclays corporate bond in-
dices. The Barclays indices represent portfolios of long-term (L) and intermediate (I) maturity corporate
bonds with AAA, AA, and A ratings. The full sample period is 1989.02–2013.12 and the pre-crisis
period is 1989.02–2007.07.
AAAL AAL AL AAAI AAI AI
Panel A: Full sample
AAAL 1.00
AAL 0.92 1.00
AL 0.88 0.97 1.00
AAAI 0.86 0.83 0.82 1.00
AAI 0.79 0.86 0.87 0.94 1.00
AI 0.76 0.83 0.88 0.90 0.96 1.00
Panel B: Pre-crisis
AAAL 1.00
AAL 0.99 1.00
AL 0.97 0.99 1.00
AAAI 0.92 0.91 0.89 1.00
AAI 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.99 1.00
AI 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.97 0.98 1.00
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Table 3: Monetary policy shocks and economic news
This table presents the estimated response of monetary policy shocks (unexpected change in the
FFR, MP ) to economic news. The latter are calculated on the basis of Reuters Economic Polls as the
difference between “actual” (the actual value that was reported by the primary source) minus “median
forecast” (the forecast figure from the polls prior to the announcement) after the actual value is released.
The following macroeconomic variables are considered: CPI inflation, core CPI inflation, change in
nonfarm payrolls, growth rate of industrial production, and growth rate of retail sales (excluding
automobiles). The full sample period is 1991.10–2013.12 and the pre-crisis period is 1991.10–2007.07.
R
2
is the adjusted R2. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **,
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Full sample Panel B: Pre-crisis
CPI inflation -0.05 -0.06
(0.05) (0.05)
Core CPI inflation 0.04 0.09
(0.05) (0.07)
Nonfarm payrolls 0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Industrial production −0.02∗ -0.01
(0.01) (0.02)
Retail sales excl. autos 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.02)
R
2
0.002 0.000
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Table 4: Responses of excess bond returns to monetary policy shocks
This table presents the estimated response of excess bond returns to monetary policy shocks (un-
expected change in the FFR, MP ), as described in Section 3. Bond returns are calculated using the
Barclays corporate bond indices, which represent portfolios of long-term (L) and intermediate (I)
maturity corporate bonds with AAA, AA, and A ratings. The full sample period is 1989.02–2013.12 and
the pre-crisis period is 1989.02–2007.07. R
2
is the adjusted R2. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
AAAL AAL AL AAAI AAI AI
Panel A: Full sample
Intercept 0.32 0.42∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.19) (0.19) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10)
MP −1.61 −1.69 −2.38 −1.94∗ −2.24∗∗ −2.18∗∗
(2.43) (2.16) (2.05) (1.01) (0.93) (0.98)
R
2
0.000 0.000 0.003 0.016 0.023 0.016
Panel B: Pre-crisis
Intercept 0.23 0.22 0.18 0.20∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.19∗∗
(0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
MP −4.90∗∗∗ −5.00∗∗∗ −5.77∗∗∗ −3.00∗∗∗ −3.27∗∗∗ −3.51∗∗∗
(1.18) (1.26) (1.27) (0.66) (0.77) (0.71)
R
2
0.044 0.044 0.058 0.059 0.070 0.082
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Table 5: Responses of excess bond returns to monetary policy shocks: controlling for business
conditions
This table presents the estimated response of excess bond returns to monetary policy shocks (un-
expected change in the FFR, MP ) controlling for business conditions, as described in Section 3. Bond
returns are calculated using the Barclays corporate bond indices, which represent portfolios of long-term
(L) and intermediate (I) maturity corporate bonds with AAA, AA, and A ratings. The business
conditions controls include the default spread (def); the term spread (term); and the log nominal
short-term risk free rate (y). The full sample period is 1989.02–2013.12 and the pre-crisis period is
1989.02–2007.07. R
2
is the adjusted R2. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
AAAL AAL AL AAAI AAI AI
Panel A: Full sample
Intercept 0.49 −0.55 0.52 −0.39 −0.45 −0.08
(2.53) (2.03) (2.15) (0.80) (0.74) (0.96)
MP −2.06 −2.35 −3.13 −2.19∗∗∗ −2.53∗∗∗ −2.59∗∗∗
(2.45) (2.04) (2.04) (0.96) (0.91) (0.95)
def −0.18 0.54 0.22 0.33 0.35 0.25
(0.81) (0.63) (0.67) (0.25) (0.24) (0.31)
term −0.24 −0.15 −0.21 −0.11 −0.09 −0.09
(0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
y −0.54 0.03 −1.08 0.35 0.32 −0.21
(2.35) (1.94) (1.98) (0.79) (0.73) (0.90)
R
2
0.000 0.012 0.004 0.041 0.051 0.027
Panel B: Pre-crisis
Intercept −0.08 −0.38 0.18 −0.81 −1.00 −0.68
(1.19) (1.24) (1.23) (0.55) (0.54) (0.57)
MP −5.26∗∗∗ −5.33∗∗∗ −6.19∗∗∗ −3.02∗∗∗ −3.27∗∗∗ −3.58∗∗∗
(1.29) (1.34) (1.32) (0.76) (0.87) (0.78)
def 0.51 0.61∗ 0.40 0.54∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗
(0.35) (0.37) (0.38) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18)
term −0.25∗ −0.24 −0.25 −0.12 −0.10 −0.11
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
y −0.86 −0.68 −1.18 0.38 0.49 0.13
(1.48) (1.51) (1.49) (0.71) (0.71) (0.73)
R
2
0.058 0.060 0.066 0.105 0.124 0.120
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Table 6: Excess bond returns forecasting regression in the benchmark VAR
This table presents the estimated coefficients for the excess bond returns equation in the benchmark
VAR(1) model presented in Section 4. The VAR state vector is given by [xn,t+1, deft+1, termt+1, yt+1]
′,
where xn denotes excess returns on the Barclays corporate bond index with average maturity n;
def denotes the default spread; term is the term spread; and y denotes the continuously compounded
one-month Treasury bill rate. The Barclays indices represent portfolios of long-term (L) and intermediate
(I) maturity corporate bonds with AAA, AA, and A ratings. The full sample period is 1989.02–2013.12
and the pre-crisis period is 1989.02–2007.07. R
2
is the adjusted R2. Heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
xn+1,t deft termt yt R
2
Panel A: Full sample
AAAL 0.07 0.17 0.53∗∗∗ 3.00 0.015
(0.13) (0.78) (0.19) (2.18)
AAL 0.05 0.76 0.55∗∗∗ 3.95∗∗ 0.037
(0.11) (0.58) (0.16) (1.77)
AL 0.12 0.65 0.55∗∗∗ 3.60∗∗ 0.041
(0.11) (0.56) (0.16) (1.68)
AAAI 0.13∗∗ 0.20 0.26∗∗∗ 1.83∗∗∗ 0.040
(0.06) (0.21) (0.07) (0.68)
AAI 0.17∗∗∗ 0.34∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 2.09∗∗∗ 0.067
(0.06) (0.16) (0.07) (0.64)
AI 0.20∗∗∗ 0.38∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 2.01∗∗∗ 0.072
(0.07) (0.22) (0.08) (0.70)
Panel B: Pre-crisis
AAAL 0.10 0.21 0.45∗∗∗ 3.17∗∗ 0.023
(0.07) (0.37) (0.15) (1.58)
AAL 0.07 0.38 0.47∗∗∗ 3.49∗∗ 0.021
(0.07) (0.39) (0.16) (1.61)
AL 0.08 0.29 0.47∗∗∗ 3.35∗∗ 0.021
(0.07) (0.40) (0.16) (1.58)
AAAI 0.15∗∗ 0.18 0.26∗∗∗ 2.17∗∗∗ 0.046
(0.07) (0.19) (0.08) (0.77)
AAI 0.16∗∗ 0.25 0.27∗∗∗ 2.33∗∗∗ 0.056
(0.07) (0.18) (0.08) (0.76)
AI 0.16∗∗ 0.24 0.27∗∗∗ 2.19∗∗∗ 0.052
(0.06) (0.19) (0.08) (0.78)
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Table 7: Variance decomposition for unexpected excess bond returns
This table presents the decomposition of the variance of unexpected excess bond returns into the
variance of interest rate news (x˜y), the variance of discount rate news (x˜x), and the covariance between
these two news components. News components are extracted from the benchmark VAR(1) model
presented in Section 4. The VAR state vector is given by [xn,t+1, deft+1, termt+1, yt+1]
′, where xn
denotes excess returns on the Barclays corporate bond index with average maturity n; def denotes
the default spread; term is the term spread; and y denotes the continuously compounded one-month
Treasury bill rate. The Barclays indices represent portfolios of long-term (L) and intermediate (I)
maturity corporate bonds with AAA, AA, and A ratings. The full sample period is 1989.02–2013.12 and
the pre-crisis period is 1989.02–2007.07. The standard errors reported in parentheses are computed using
the delta method. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
AAAL AAL AL AAAI AAI AI
Panel A: Full sample
V ar [x˜y] 0.30
∗∗ 0.38 0.21 0.45 0.71 0.65∗
(0.13) (0.35) (0.14) (0.35) (0.48) (0.35)
2Cov [x˜y, x˜x] 0.15 -0.39 -0.01 -0.14 -0.78 -0.55
(0.20) (0.86) (0.41) (0.67) (1.05) (0.85)
V ar [x˜x] 0.55
∗∗∗ 1.02∗ 0.80∗∗ 0.69∗ 1.07∗ 0.90
(0.18) (0.55) (0.32) (0.38) (0.63) (0.57)
Panel B: Pre-crisis
V ar [x˜y] 0.10
∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.31 0.44 0.41
(0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.25) (0.36) (0.27)
2Cov [x˜y, x˜x] 0.05 -0.04 0.03 -0.27 -0.51 -0.37
(0.20) (0.24) (0.19) (0.43) (0.59) (0.50)
V ar [x˜x] 0.85
∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 1.07∗∗ 0.97∗∗
(0.22) (0.24) (0.20) (0.37) (0.43) (0.40)
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Table 8: VAR-based responses of unexpected excess bond returns to monetary policy shocks
This table reports presents the estimated response of unexpected excess bond returns (x˜MPn ) and
the two news components (interest rate news, x˜MPy , and discount rate news, x˜
MP
x ) to monetary policy
shocks (unexpected change in the FFR, MP ). News components are extracted from the benchmark
VAR(1) presented in Section 4. The VAR state vector is given by [xn,t+1, deft+1, termt+1, yt+1]
′, where
xn denotes excess returns on the Barclays corporate bond index with average maturity n; def denotes
the default spread; term is the term spread; and y denotes the continuously compounded one-month
Treasury bill rate. The Barclays indices represent portfolios of long-term (L) and intermediate (I)
maturity corporate bonds with AAA, AA, and A ratings. The full sample period is 1989.02–2013.12 and
the pre-crisis period is 1989.02–2007.07. The standard errors reported in parentheses are computed using
the delta method. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
AAAL AAL AL AAAI AAI AI
Panel A: Full sample
x˜MPn -0.45 −0.84∗ −1.46∗∗∗ −1.45∗∗∗ −1.77∗∗∗ −1.86∗∗∗
(0.60) (0.48) (0.49) (0.21) (0.21) (0.23)
x˜MPy −0.78 0.49 1.20∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗∗ 1.48∗∗∗
(0.76) (0.77) (0.59) (0.33) (0.40) (0.46)
x˜MPx 1.22
∗∗ 0.35 0.26 0.59∗∗ 0.38 0.37
(0.50) (0.73) (0.56) (0.26) (0.34) (0.40)
Panel B: Pre-crisis
x˜MPn −3.74∗∗∗ −3.81∗∗∗ −4.61∗∗∗ −2.29∗∗∗ −2.51∗∗∗ −2.82∗∗∗
(0.46) (0.47) (0.46) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23)
x˜MPy 0.29 0.17 1.00 0.33 0.51 0.95
(0.62) (0.70) (0.61) (0.54) (0.62) (0.65)
x˜MPx 3.45
∗∗∗ 3.64∗∗∗ 3.62∗∗∗ 1.96∗∗∗ 2.00∗∗∗ 1.87∗∗∗
(0.52) (0.62) (0.53) (0.44) (0.53) (0.53)
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Table 9: Variance decomposition for unexpected excess bond returns: alternative bond return
decomposition
This table presents the decomposition of the variance of unexpected excess bond returns into the
variance of interest rate news (x˜y), the variance of term premium news (x˜
G
x ), the variance of credit risk
premium news (x˜Cx ) and the covariances between these three news components. News components are
extracted from the benchmark VAR(1) model presented in Appendix C. The VAR state vector is given
by [xn,t+1, x
G
n,t+1, deft+1, termt+1, yt+1]
′, where xn denotes excess returns on the Barclays corporate
bond index with average maturity n; xGn,t+1 denotes the excess return (relative to the risk-free rate) of a
Treasury bond with average maturity n; def denotes the default spread; term is the term spread; and
y denotes the continuously compounded one-month Treasury bill rate. The Barclays indices represent
portfolios of long-term (L) and intermediate (I) maturity corporate bonds with AAA, AA, and A
ratings. The full sample period is 1989.02–2013.12 and the pre-crisis period is 1989.02–2007.07. The
standard errors reported in parentheses are computed using the delta method. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
AAAL AAL AL AAAI AAI AI
Panel A: Full sample
V ar [x˜y] 0.26 0.26 0.12
∗ 0.26 0.42 0.39∗
(0.24) (0.27) (0.07) (0.18) (0.28) (0.21)
2Cov
[
x˜Gx , x˜y
]
0.04 0.07 0.11 -0.05 -0.11 0.06
(0.27) (0.36) (0.15) (0.34) (0.51) (0.30)
2Cov
[
x˜Cx , x˜y
]
-0.04 -0.35 -0.05 0.03 −0.32 -0.29
(0.37) (0.42) (0.15) (0.19) (0.26) (0.29)
V ar
[
x˜Gx
]
0.39∗∗ 0.53∗∗ 0.49∗∗ 0.44 0.47 0.36∗
(0.19) (0.25) (0.24) (0.29) (0.30) (0.22)
2Cov
[
x˜Gx , x˜
C
x
]
0.26 0.18 0.15 0.26∗∗∗ 0.34 0.25
(0.19) (0.49) (0.34) (0.10) (0.26) (0.25)
V ar
[
x˜Cx
]
0.08 0.32 0.19 0.06 0.21 0.23
(0.19) (0.23) (0.24) (0.05) (0.18) (0.21)
Panel B: Pre-crisis
V ar [x˜y] 0.10
∗ 0.13∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.30 0.42 0.40
(0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.26) (0.36) (0.29)
2Cov
[
x˜Gx , x˜y
]
0.10 0.12 0.10 -0.23 -0.29 -0.16
(0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.47) (0.56) (0.49)
2Cov
[
x˜Cx , x˜y
]
0.00 -0.08 0.01 0.04 −0.11 -0.10
(0.08) (0.12) (0.09) (0.17) (0.15) (0.22)
V ar
[
x˜Gx
]
0.64∗∗ 0.61∗∗ 0.59∗∗ 0.71∗ 0.70∗ 0.69∗
(0.29) (0.28) (0.27) (0.40) (0.39) (0.40)
2Cov
[
x˜Gx , x˜
C
x
]
0.10 0.10 0.11 0.16 0.25∗ 0.16
(0.18) (0.22) (0.20) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16)
V ar
[
x˜Cx
]
0.06 0.13 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.02
(0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
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Table 10: VAR-based responses of unexpected excess bond returns to monetary policy shocks:
alternative bond return decomposition
This table reports presents the estimated response of unexpected excess bond returns (x˜MPn ) and
the three news components (interest rate news, x˜MPy ; term premium news, x˜
GMP
x ; and credit risk
premium news, x˜CMPx ) to monetary policy shocks (unexpected change in the FFR, MP ). News
components are extracted from the benchmark VAR(1) model presented in Appendix C. The VAR state
vector is given by [xn,t+1, x
G
n,t+1, deft+1, termt+1, yt+1]
′, where xn denotes excess returns on the Barclays
corporate bond index with average maturity n; xGn,t+1 denotes the excess return (relative to the risk-free
rate) of a Treasury bond with average maturity n; def denotes the default spread; term is the term
spread; and y denotes the continuously compounded one-month Treasury bill rate. The Barclays indices
represent portfolios of long-term (L) and intermediate (I) maturity corporate bonds with AAA, AA, and
A ratings. The full sample period is 1989.02–2013.12 and the pre-crisis period is 1989.02–2007.07. The
standard errors reported in parentheses are computed using the delta method. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
AAAL AAL AL AAAI AAI AI
Panel A: Full sample
x˜MPn −0.20 −0.78 −1.35∗∗∗ −1.34∗∗∗ −1.72∗∗∗ −1.78∗∗∗
(0.76) (0.49) (0.55) (0.25) (0.24) (0.27)
x˜MPy −1.32∗∗ 0.33 0.80∗ 0.79∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗ 1.46∗∗∗
(0.64) (0.71) (0.45) (0.35) (0.39) (0.44)
x˜GMPx 0.98
∗ 0.76 0.92 0.32 0.35 0.38
(0.50) (0.61) (0.60) (0.39) (0.35) (0.33)
x˜CMPx 0.54 -0.31 -0.37 0.24 0.004 −0.06
(0.61) (0.50) (0.47) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19)
Panel B: Pre-crisis
x˜MPn −3.76∗∗∗ −3.83∗∗∗ −4.60∗∗∗ −2.28∗∗∗ −2.51∗∗∗ −2.82∗∗∗
(0.46) (0.47) (0.46) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23)
x˜MPy 0.41 0.32 1.03
∗ 0.39 0.52 0.97
(0.62) (0.68) (0.62) (0.52) (0.57) (0.63)
x˜GMPx 2.76
∗∗∗ 2.77∗∗∗ 2.79∗∗∗ 1.65∗∗∗ 1.69∗∗∗ 1.67∗∗∗
(0.67) (0.69) (0.69) (0.55) (0.54) (0.57)
x˜CMPx 0.59 0.75 0.79 0.24 0.30 0.18
(0.51) (0.68) (0.64) (0.21) (0.21) (0.24)
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Table A.1: VAR-based response of unexpected excess bond returns to monetary policy shocks:
alternative state vector 1 (adding dp)
This table reports presents the estimated response of unexpected excess bond returns (x˜MPn ) and
the two news components (interest rate news, x˜MPy , and discount rate news, x˜
MP
x ) to monetary policy
shocks (unexpected change in the FFR, MP ). News components are extracted from a VAR(1) model
where the state vector is given by [xn,t+1, deft+1, termt+1, yt+1, dpt+1]
′, where xn denotes excess returns
on the Barclays corporate bond index with average maturity n; def denotes the default spread; term is
the term spread; y denotes the continuously compounded one-month Treasury bill rate; and dp is the log
dividend-to-price ratio for the S& P500 stock market index. The Barclays indices represent portfolios
of long-term (L) and intermediate (I) maturity corporate bonds with AAA, AA, and A ratings. The
sample period is 1989.02–2007.07. The standard errors reported in parentheses are computed using
the delta method. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
AAAL AAL AL AAAI AAI AI
x˜MPn −3.79∗∗∗ −3.86∗∗∗ −4.64∗∗∗ −2.34∗∗∗ −2.56∗∗∗ −2.85∗∗∗
(0.45) (0.46) (0.45) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23)
x˜MPy 0.39 0.52 0.86 0.47 0.70 1.06
∗
(0.77) (0.77) (0.88) (0.46) (0.54) (0.61)
x˜MPx 3.40
∗∗∗ 3.34∗∗∗ 3.78∗∗∗ 1.87∗∗∗ 1.86∗∗∗ 1.79∗∗∗
(0.64) (0.69) (0.77) (0.39) (0.48) (0.50)
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Table A.2: VAR-based response of unexpected excess bond returns to monetary policy shocks:
alternative state vector 2 (adding ANFCI)
This table reports presents the estimated response of unexpected excess bond returns (x˜MPn ) and
the two news components (interest rate news, x˜MPy , and discount rate news, x˜
MP
x ) to monetary policy
shocks (unexpected change in the FFR, MP ). News components are extracted from a VAR(1) model
where the state vector is given by [xn,t+1, deft+1, termt+1, yt+1, ANFCIt+1]
′, where xn denotes excess
returns on the Barclays corporate bond index with average maturity n; def denotes the default spread;
term is the term spread; y denotes the continuously compounded one-month Treasury bill rate; and
ANFCI is the Chicago Fed Adjusted National Financial Conditions Index. The Barclays indices
represent portfolios of long-term (L) and intermediate (I) maturity corporate bonds with AAA, AA,
and A ratings. The sample period is 1989.02–2007.07. The standard errors reported in parentheses are
computed using the delta method. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
AAAL AAL AL AAAI AAI AI
x˜MPn −3.66∗∗∗ −3.73∗∗∗ −4.55∗∗∗ −2.26∗∗∗ −2.48∗∗∗ −2.80∗∗∗
(0.46) (0.47) (0.46) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23)
x˜MPy 0.27 0.10 0.98
∗ 0.34 0.47 0.95
(0.60) (0.68) (0.59) (0.51) (0.59) (0.61)
x˜MPx 3.39
∗∗∗ 3.63∗∗∗ 3.57∗∗∗ 1.93∗∗∗ 2.02∗∗∗ 1.85∗∗∗
(0.51) (0.63) (0.52) (0.43) (0.52) (0.52)
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Table A.3: VAR-based response of unexpected excess bond returns to monetary policy shocks:
alternative state vector 3 (adding CFNAI)
This table reports presents the estimated response of unexpected excess bond returns (x˜MPn ) and
the two news components (interest rate news, x˜MPy , and discount rate news, x˜
MP
x ) to monetary policy
shocks (unexpected change in the FFR, MP ). News components are extracted from a VAR(1) model
where the state vector is given by [xn,t+1, deft+1, termt+1, yt+1, CFNAIt+1]
′, where xn denotes excess
returns on the Barclays corporate bond index with average maturity n; def denotes the default spread;
term is the term spread; y denotes the continuously compounded one-month Treasury bill rate; and
CFNAI is the Chicago Fed National Activity Index. The Barclays indices represent portfolios of
long-term (L) and intermediate (I) maturity corporate bonds with AAA, AA, and A ratings. The
sample period is 1989.02–2007.07. The standard errors reported in parentheses are computed using
the delta method. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
AAAL AAL AL AAAI AAI AI
x˜MPn −3.31∗∗∗ −3.39∗∗∗ −4.17∗∗∗ −2.06∗∗∗ −2.28∗∗∗ −2.56∗∗∗
(0.52) (0.52) (0.51) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27)
x˜MPy 0.29 0.17 0.99
∗ 0.33 0.51 0.94
(0.61) (0.69) (0.60) (0.53) (0.61) (0.63)
x˜MPx 3.02
∗∗∗ 3.21∗∗∗ 3.17∗∗∗ 1.73∗∗∗ 1.77∗∗∗ 1.62∗∗∗
(0.52) (0.61) (0.54) (0.42) (0.51) (0.51)
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Table A.4: VAR-based response of unexpected excess bond returns to monetary policy shocks:
higher order VAR
This table reports presents the estimated response of unexpected excess bond returns (x˜MPn ) and
the two news components (interest rate news, x˜MPy , and discount rate news, x˜
MP
x ) to monetary policy
shocks (unexpected change in the FFR, MP ). News components are extracted from a VAR(3) model
where the state vector is given [xn,t+1, deft+1, termt+1, yt+1]
′, where xn denotes excess returns on the
Barclays corporate bond index with average maturity n; def denotes the default spread; term is the
term spread; and y denotes the continuously compounded one-month Treasury bill rate. The Barclays
indices represent portfolios of long-term (L) and intermediate (I) maturity corporate bonds with AAA,
AA, and A ratings. The sample period is 1989.02–2007.07. The standard errors reported in parentheses
are computed using the delta method. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
AAAL AAL AL AAAI AAI AI
x˜MPn −3.88∗∗∗ −4.01∗∗∗ −4.65∗∗∗ −2.21∗∗∗ −2.55∗∗∗ −2.83∗∗∗
(0.45) (0.47) (0.48) (0.26) (0.24) (0.26)
x˜MPy 0.05 0.21 0.71 -0.02 0.10 0.42
(0.57) (0.57) (0.50) (0.52) (0.62) (0.63)
x˜MPx 3.82
∗∗∗ 3.80∗∗∗ 3.94∗∗∗ 2.24∗∗∗ 2.45∗∗∗ 2.41∗∗∗
(0.64) (0.61) (0.54) (0.49) (0.59) (0.59)
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Table A.5: VAR-based response of unexpected excess bond returns to monetary policy shocks:
consol bonds
This table reports presents the estimated response of unexpected excess bond returns (x˜MPn ) and
the two news components (interest rate news, x˜MPy , and discount rate news, x˜
MP
x ) to monetary policy
shocks (unexpected change in the FFR, MP ). News components are extracted from a VAR(1) model
where the state vector is given by [xn,t+1, deft+1, termt+1, yt+1]
′, where xn denotes excess returns on
the Barclays corporate bond index with infinite average maturity; def denotes the default spread; term
is the term spread; and y denotes the continuously compounded one-month Treasury bill rate. The
relevant formulas for consol bonds are used. The Barclays indices represent portfolios of corporate bonds
with AAA, AA, and A ratings. The sample period is 1989.02–2007.07. The standard errors reported in
parentheses are computed using the delta method. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
AAAL AAL AL
x˜MPn −3.74∗∗∗ −3.81∗∗∗ −4.61∗∗∗
(0.46) (0.47) (0.46)
x˜MPy 0.29 0.17 1.00
(0.62) (0.70) (0.61)
x˜MPx 3.45
∗∗∗ 3.64∗∗∗ 3.62∗∗∗
(0.52) (0.62) (0.53)
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Table A.6: VAR-based response of unexpected excess bond returns to monetary policy shocks:
alternative identification (discount rate news as residual)
This table reports presents the estimated response of unexpected excess bond returns (x˜MPn ) and
the two news components (interest rate news, x˜MPy , and discount rate news, x˜
MP
x ) to monetary policy
shocks (unexpected change in the FFR, MP ). News components are extracted from a VAR(1) model
where the state vector is given by [xn,t+1, deft+1, termt+1, yt+1]
′, where xn denotes excess returns on
the Barclays corporate bond index with average maturity n; def denotes the default spread; term is the
term spread; and y denotes the continuously compounded one-month Treasury bill rate. Discount rate
news are backed out as the residual component of the decomposition. The Barclays indices represent
portfolios of long-term (L) and intermediate (I) maturity corporate bonds with AAA, AA, and A ratings.
The sample period is 1989.02–2007.07. The standard errors reported in parentheses are computed using
the delta method. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
AAAL AAL AL AAAI AAI AI
x˜MPn −3.74∗∗∗ −3.81∗∗∗ −4.61∗∗∗ −2.29∗∗∗ −2.51∗∗∗ −2.82∗∗∗
(0.46) (0.47) (0.46) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23)
x˜MPy 0.74 0.74 0.78 0.84 0.84 0.88
(0.64) (0.63) (0.64) (0.54) (0.53) (0.55)
x˜MPx 2.99
∗∗∗ 3.06∗∗∗ 3.83∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗ 1.94∗∗∗
(0.45) (0.47) (0.49) (0.40) (0.40) (0.42)
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Table A.7: VAR-based responses of unexpected excess bond returns to monetary policy shocks:
lagged monetary policy shocks
This table reports presents the estimated response of unexpected excess bond returns (x˜LMPn )
and the two news components (interest rate news, x˜LMPy , and discount rate news, x˜
LMP
x ) to one-period
lagged monetary policy shocks (lagged unexpected change in the FFR, LMP ). News components are
extracted from a VAR(1) model where the state vector is given by [xn,t+1, deft+1, termt+1, yt+1]
′, where
xn denotes excess returns on the Barclays corporate bond index with average maturity n; def denotes
the default spread; term is the term spread; and y denotes the continuously compounded one-month
Treasury bill rate. The Barclays indices represent portfolios of long-term (L) and intermediate (I)
maturity corporate bonds with AAA, AA, and A ratings. The sample period is 1989.02–2007.07. The
standard errors reported in parentheses are computed using the delta method. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
AAAL AAL AL AAAI AAI AI
x˜LMPn −1.41∗∗∗ −1.63∗∗∗ −1.75∗∗∗ −0.78∗∗∗ −1.02∗∗∗ −0.92∗∗∗
(0.52) (0.54) (0.57) (0.27) (0.30) (0.29)
x˜LMPy -0.24 -0.01 0.53 -0.18 -0.10 0.00
(0.49) (0.59) (0.47) (0.45) (0.54) (0.50)
x˜LMPx 1.17
∗∗ 1.64∗∗ 1.22∗∗ 0.96∗∗ 1.13∗∗ 0.93∗∗
(0.55) (0.64) (0.60) (0.43) (0.51) (0.46)
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Table A.8: VAR-based responses of unexpected excess bond returns to monetary policy shocks:
Romer and Romer (2004) monetary policy shocks
This table reports presents the estimated response of unexpected excess bond returns (x˜RMPn )
and the two news components (interest rate news, x˜RMPy , and discount rate news, x˜
RMP
x ) to the Romer
and Romer (2004) monetary policy shocks (RMP ). News components are extracted from a VAR(1)
model where the state vector is given by [xn,t+1, deft+1, termt+1, yt+1]
′, where xn denotes excess returns
on the Barclays corporate bond index with average maturity n; def denotes the default spread; term
is the term spread; and y denotes the continuously compounded one-month Treasury bill rate. The
Barclays indices represent portfolios of long-term (L) and intermediate (I) maturity corporate bonds
with AAA, AA, and A ratings. The sample period is 1989.02–2007.07. The standard errors reported in
parentheses are computed using the delta method. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
AAAL AAL AL AAAI AAI AI
x˜RMPn −1.88∗∗∗ −2.09∗∗∗ −2.45∗∗∗ −0.77∗∗∗ −0.87∗∗∗ −1.10∗∗∗
(0.44) (0.46) (0.48) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23)
x˜RMPy 0.33 0.21 0.70 −0.20 −0.25 0.03
(0.39) (0.49) (0.45) (0.39) (0.48) (0.40) )
x˜RMPx 1.56
∗∗∗ 1.87∗∗∗ 1.74∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗ 1.07∗∗∗
(0.50) (0.58) (0.52) (0.38) (0.46) (0.39)
56
Table A.9: VAR-based response of unexpected excess bond returns to monetary policy shocks:
risk premium-adjusted monetary policy shocks
This table reports presents the estimated response of unexpected excess bond returns (x˜AMPn )
and the two news components (interest rate news, x˜AMPy , and discount rate news, x˜
AMP
x ) to risk
premium-adjusted monetary policy shocks (AMP ). News components are extracted from a VAR(1)
model where the state vector is given by [xn,t+1, deft+1, termt+1, yt+1]
′, where xn denotes excess returns
on the Barclays corporate bond index with average maturity n; def denotes the default spread; term
is the term spread; and y denotes the continuously compounded one-month Treasury bill rate. The
Barclays indices represent portfolios of long-term (L) and intermediate (I) maturity corporate bonds
with AAA, AA, and A ratings. The sample period is 1989.02–2007.07. The standard errors reported in
parentheses are computed using the delta method. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
AAAL AAL AL AAAI AAI AI
x˜AMPn −3.99∗∗∗ −4.07∗∗∗ −4.89∗∗∗ −2.40∗∗∗ −2.67∗∗∗ −2.99∗∗∗
(0.43) (0.44) (0.44) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22)
x˜AMPy 0.20 0.05 0.90 0.25 0.45 0.91
(0.64) (0.71) (0.63) (0.56) (0.65) (0.67)
x˜AMPx 3.79
∗∗∗ 4.02∗∗∗ 3.99∗∗∗ 2.16∗∗∗ 2.22∗∗∗ 2.08∗∗∗
(0.54) (0.63) (0.55) (0.46) (0.55) (0.56)
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